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SUMMARY
U.S. state and local (subnational) governments issue municipal bonds in the capital
markets to finance infrastructure projects such as schools, roads, and bridges. These se-
curities are first sold in the primary municipal bond market and subsequently resold in
the secondary market. This dissertation explores the primary and secondary subnational
debt markets and their impact on state and local governments. The first chapter provides
background information on the municipal bond market. The second chapter estimates the
market-implied marginal tax rates associated with tax-exempt debt. The third chapter es-
timates the effect of the secondary municipal bond market on future cost of borrowing for
debt-issuing governments. The fourth chapter explores why some securities trade thou-
sands of times in the secondary market while most never trade. The fifth chapter concludes
the dissertation and discusses relevant policy implications.
The size of the subnational debt has surpassed $3.8 trillion as of the third quarter of 2017
[1]. Understanding the primary and secondary municipal bonds markets and the impact of
these markets on issuers can allow thousands of debt-issuing state and local governments to
save billions of dollars in borrowing costs. This is important because reducing borrowing
costs, in turn, can free up funds for other public services such as education and health care.
Debt is a crucial part of public finances. As such, this dissertation contributes to the public
finance literature, particularly in the area of public financial management research.
Chapter 1: Background. The majority of state and local governments in the U.S.
have debt-issuing capacity. There is quite a bit of heterogeneity in the types of issuers1
and financial products that are issued in the municipal bond market. The variety of market
participants (underwriters, dealer-brokers, etc.) add further complexity to the debt perfor-
mance outcomes of issuers. The main feature that sets the muni market apart from other
capital markets is the tax exemption of interest income - most municipal bonds are exempt
1There are over 90, 000 government entities of which about 40, 000 are general purpose governments and
the rest are special and school districts. See Section 1.1.
x
from federal, state, and certain local income taxes.
Chapter 2: Primary Market. Eliminating or limiting tax exempt-status of municipal
bonds becomes a potential policy alternative in periods of budgetary distress, given that
taxes foregone due to exemption amount to billions of dollars per year to the federal gov-
ernment. This chapter estimates the implied marginal tax rates associated with tax-exempt
munis to understand the tax-reduction benefits accrued to state and local governments. In
this analysis, tax-exempt munis are matched to near-identical taxable munis, which creates
a unique quasi-experimental design. Results of the Random Coefficients Model (RCM),
which accounts for issuer- and issuance-level unobserved effects, show significant hetero-
geneity in implied marginal tax rates across issuer types (e.g. counties vs. school districts)
and over time. The longstanding muni puzzle, the finding that interest on tax-exempt bonds
is higher than the theory would predict, disappears for general purpose governments, once
the nested structure and the product and issuer heterogeneity of the municipal bond market
are taken into account. Results imply that municipal forms of government benefit the most
from the tax exemption, while special districts benefit the least.
Chapter 3: Effect of the Secondary Market On the Primary Market. The primary
market for state and local government borrowing receives great attention yet researchers
as well as subnational debt-issuing governments tend to ignore the secondary municipal
bond market. However, if the primary market rewards the performance of the issuer’s
outstanding debt in the secondary market, then state and local governments are neglecting
an important piece of the puzzle and the potential to reduce future borrowing costs. This
study combines large proprietary databases of primary and secondary market information to
test whether the performance of existing debt in the secondary market affects future cost of
borrowing for state and local governments. Results show that fluctuations in the secondary
market prices and yields impact future borrowing costs. Further, the effect of the secondary
market varies significantly by issuer. Findings imply that the secondary market contains an
additional layer of real-time quality information not captured by other lagged metrics such
xi
as credit ratings.
Chapter 4: Secondary Market. The municipal bond market is full of peculiarities.
One such puzzling fact is that some securities trade thousands of times in the secondary
market while most do not trade at all. Studies have shown that these differences in trading
frequency cannot simply be attributed to transaction costs - actively traded bonds are not
necessarily less expensive to trade. Understanding what accounts for such distinct patterns
of trading activity can inform investors and issuers about market demand and potentially
improve government debt issuance outcomes and household portfolio allocation decisions.
This paper examines the dispersion of trading activity of municipal securities in the sec-
ondary market using large databases of security- and transaction-level information. Results
show that safer and high quality securities tend to be taken off the market quickly and
most likely absorbed into the portfolios of buy-and-hold type investors. Further, the call
complexity hypothesis reveals distinct trading patterns for different trade types (interdealer
trades vs. retail customer trades) as the call date approaches. Finally, there is some evi-
dence of speculative trading in the secondary market which further contributes to the wide
dispersion in trading activity among various securities.
Chapter 5: Conclusion. The first set of findings show that the effect of the municipal
bond tax exemption policy are substantial. Smaller municipalities benefit the most from
the ability to issue tax-exempt munis. Second, I find that the secondary market contains
an additional layer of real-time quality information not captured by other lagged metrics
such as credit ratings. This information contained in the secondary market performance of
the issuer’s existing debt has a direct impact on future borrowing costs for state and local
governments. Finally, hyper-trading in secondary market for municipal bonds is explained
using several conceptual frameworks, such as portfolio absorption, speculative trading, and
call complexity.
xii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1
1.1 SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
The decentralized nature of the U.S. government creates significant heterogeneity in
types of governments as well as debt issued by these governments. In addition to the 50
states, five territories, and the District of Columbia (DC), there are 3,031 counties, 35,879
municipalities (cities, town, townships, villages, boroughs), 38,266 special districts (such
as utilities, port authorities, etc.), and 12,880 independent school districts in the United
States according to the most recent 2012 U.S. Census of Governments. Debt issued by
state and local governments is commonly referred to as subnational or municipal debt.
City and county governments are usually the largest both in population size and expen-
diture among subnational governments. Special districts, on the other hand, are usually
the smallest entities with a singular operational purpose such as treating waste or provid-
ing electricity. While states receive most of their revenues from income taxes, most cities,
counties, and school districts rely on property taxes. Special districts, on the other hand, are
generally funded through user fees. State governments enjoy a certain level of autonomy
from the federal government, while local governments are creatures of their parent state
governments.
1.2 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES/MUNICIPAL BONDS
Municipal bonds or municipal securities (munis) characterize debt issued in the capital
markets by state and local (subnational) governments to fund various capital infrastructure
projects such as roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and parks. Most municipal bonds are
issued in multiple increments at different prices with different par amounts, maturity dates,
coupon payments, and CUSIP numbers. Bonds issued in multiple increments are called
serial bonds. Bonds that are comprised of a single maturity are called term bonds. Each
maturity/security is assigned a 9-digit CUSIP number, a unique security identifier issued by
the Committees on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) Bureau. The first
2
six digits of the CUSIP number identify the issuer and the last three digits/letters identify a
specific maturity.
Figure 1.1 provides a visual example of a structure of a municipal debt issuance. The
excerpt from the 2010 Official Statement (OS) of the State of New York (NY) shows a
single debt issuance. Within this one debt issuance, the State of New York issued five term
bonds and three different serial bonds - Series 2010A, Series 2010B, and Series 2010C. The
first term bond in the amount of $3, 560, 000 with a 4.125% coupon is due March 1, 2032
at a yield of 4.3000%. Each of the serial bonds have multiple maturities while term bonds
have a single maturity. Series 2010A at the top of the Figure 1.1 is comprised of 20 different
maturities (10 on the right side of the top panel and 10 on the left side of the top panel) that
were issued simultaneously and mature between 2011 and 2030 with various par amounts,1
interest (coupon) rates,2 and offering yields.3 In Figure 1.1, each CUSIP is referred to as a
security/maturity, each series is referred to as a bond (including term bonds), and the entire
table is referred to as an issuance in the remainder of this dissertation. For example, the first
half of the first row of the first panel in Figure 1.1 identifies CUSIP 649791AY6. Notice
that all of the securities share the base CUSIP number 649791.
There is significant heterogeneity in the municipal bond market both in terms of is-
suers as well as products. Municipal bonds can be short or long-term, general obligation
or revenue-backed, with different call features, credit ratings, and other security character-
istics. There are also various market participants in the muni market. The main regulatory
agency in the municipal bond market, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB)
created by Congress in 1975, operates with a mission to protect investors, the public, and,
since 2010, state and local governments. The next sections discuss the role of financial
intermediaries and the types of investors in the municipal bond market.
1Par amount is also referred to as par, face value, or the principal. This is the amount to be paid back to
the investor at maturity.
2Coupon rate determines the fixed interest payments each period. For example, a 2% annual coupon rate
means that the investor gets a coupon payment equal to 2% of the par amount of the maturity every year.
3See Equation 2.1 for the price/yield relationship formula.
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 STATE OF NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS 
AMOUNTS, MATURITIES, INTEREST RATES, AND YIELDS OR PRICES 
$181,255,000 Series 2010A Tax-Exempt Bonds 
(Base CUSIP Number†: 649791) 
Amount 
Maturity 
(March 1) 
Interest 
Rate 
Yield/ 
Price CUSIP #† 
 
Amount 
Maturity 
(March 1) 
Interest 
Rate 
Yield/ 
Price CUSIP #† 
 $14,990,000 2011 2.000% 0.330% AY6 $2,155,000 2021 3.125% 3.210% BJ8 
 $15,290,000 2012 2.000% 0.750% AZ3 $2,215,000 2022 3.250% 3.350% BK5 
 $15,595,000 2013 2.000% 1.000% BA7 $2,290,000 2023 3.375% 3.450% BL3 
 $15,905,000 2014 2.000% 1.300% BB5 $2,365,000 2024 3.500% 3.550% BM1 
 $16,225,000 2015 3.000% 1.690% BC3 $2,455,000 2025 3.500% 3.650% BN9 
 $16,710,000 2016 3.000% 2.130% BD1 $2,025,000 2026 3.625% 3.750% BP4 
 $17,215,000 2017 3.000% 2.450% BE9 $2,105,000 2027 3.750% 3.850% BQ2 
 $ 8,250,000 2018 4.000% 2.700% BF6 $2,180,000 2028 4.000% 3.950% BR0 
 $ 8,580,000 2019 3.000% 2.890% BG4 $2,265,000 2029 4.000% 4.050% BS8 
 $ 8,840,000 2020 0.000% 3.450% BH2 $2,360,000 2030 4.000% 4.070% BT6 
          
$3,560,000 4.125% Term Bonds due March 1, 2032, at a yield of 4.300% 
(CUSIP†: 649791BU3) 
$5,925,000 4.375% Term Bonds due March 1, 2035, at a yield of 4.500% 
(CUSIP†: 649791BV1) 
$11,755,000 4.500% Term Bonds due March 1, 2040, at a yield of 4.580% 
(CUSIP†: 649791BW9) 
$50,980,000 Series 2010B Taxable Bonds 
(Base CUSIP Number†: 649791) 
Amount 
Maturity 
(March 1) 
Interest 
Rate 
Yield/ 
Price CUSIP #† 
 
Amount 
Maturity 
(March 1) 
Interest 
Rate 
Yield/ 
Price CUSIP #† 
$4,610,000 2011 1.000% 0.698% BX7 $5,080,000 2016 3.250% 3.257% CC2 
$4,655,000 2012 1.250% 1.228% BY5 $5,245,000 2017 3.600% 3.507% CD0 
$4,710,000 2013 2.000% 1.961% BZ2 $5,435,000 2018 3.750% 3.707% CE8 
$4,805,000 2014 2.600% 2.538% CA6 $5,635,000 2019 4.100% 4.042% CF5 
$4,935,000 2015 3.000% 2.938% CB4 $5,870,000 2020 4.250% 4.242% CG3 
 
$216,860,000 Series 2010C Build America Bonds 
(Base CUSIP Number†: 649791) 
Amount 
Maturity 
(March 1) 
Interest 
Rate 
Yield/ 
Price CUSIP #† 
 
Amount 
Maturity 
(March 1) 
Interest 
Rate 
Yield/ 
Price CUSIP #† 
 $ 9,475,000 2018 4.090% 4.090% CH1 $12,860,000 2025 4.890% 4.890% CQ1 
 $ 9,860,000 2019 4.290% 4.290% CJ7 $13,490,000 2026 5.190% 5.190% CR9 
 $ 10,285,000 2020 4.340% 4.340% CK4 $14,190,000 2027 5.290% 5.290% CS7 
 $10,730,000 2021 4.440% 4.440% CL2 $14,940,000 2028 5.390% 5.390% CT5 
 $11,205,000 2022 4.540% 4.540% CM0 $15,745,000 2029 5.440% 5.440% CU2 
 $11,715,000 2023 4.690% 4.690% CN8  $16,600,000 2030 5.540% 5.540% CV0 
 $12,265,000 2024 4.840% 4.840% CP3       
           
$23,125,000 5.590% Term Bonds due March 1, 2035, at a yield of 5.590% 
CUSIP†: 649791CW8 
$30,375,000 5.620% Term Bonds due March 1, 2040, at a yield of 5.620% 
CUSIP†: 649791CX6 
 
                                                        
† Copyright, American Bankers Association. CUSIP data herein are provided by Standard & Poor’s, CUSIP Service Bureau, a 
division of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. The CUSIP numbers listed above are being provided solely for the 
convenience of Bondholders only at the time of issuance of the Bonds and the State makes no representation with respect to 
such numbers nor undertakes any responsibility for their accuracy now or at any time in the future.  The CUSIP number for 
a specific maturity is subject to being changed after the issuance of the Bonds as a result of various subsequent actions 
including, but not limited to, a refunding in whole or in part of such maturity or as a result of the procurement of secondary 
market portfolio insurance or other similar enhancement by investors that is applicable to all or a portion of certain 
maturities of the Bonds. 
Figure 1.1: Excerpt from The Official Statement of The State f New York (2010)
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1.3 DEBT ISSUANCE PROCESS
Once a subnational government decides to issue a bond or a set of bonds, a financing
team consisting of various professionals such as municipal advisors, bond counsel, rating
agencies, trustees, underwriters, etc. is assembled to start the underwriting process.4 Un-
derwriters are one of the most important market participants in the debt issuance process.
Typically, the underwriting investment bank(s) purchase(s) the entire bond issuance from
the issuer at a discount and sell(s) these securities to the investors at the offer price. The dif-
ference between the offer price paid by the investors and the price paid by the underwriter,
also known as the gross spread, compensates the underwriting group for their services.
In a competitive sale, the issuer requests bids from underwriters and accepts the best bid,
whereas in a negotiated sale, the issuer works with a single underwriter or underwriting
syndicate to structure and price the debt.
1.4 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BONDMARKETS
The debt issuance process between the issuer and the underwriter and the first transac-
tion between the underwriters and the initial investor take place in the primary municipal
bond market. The new debt issuance is accompanied with an official statement (OS) which
contains important information about the bonds and the issuer. The OS serves as the main
source of information for potential investors. Any subsequent sale of municipal securities
following the initial sale take place in the secondary market. The MSRB supplies the OS
and other relevant primary and secondary market trade information to the public on its
website at www.emma.msrb.org.
The secondary municipal bond market is an over-the-counter, dealer market with no
central exchange. Most municipal securities rarely trade in the secondary market given
that most investors buy and hold munis until maturity. However, if an investor chooses
4The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) describes the role of each team member on the
MSRB website: http://msrb.org/msrb1/pdfs/Financing-Team.pdf.
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Table 1.1: Holders of U.S. Municipal Securities ($ Billions)
2017 Individuals/
Households
Mutual
Funds6
Banking In-
stitutions7
Insurance
companies8
Other 9 Total
Q1 1,646.4 912.9 580.7 517.0 172.4 3,829.3
Q2 1,626.6 925.3 585.3 522.9 176.9 3,837.0
Q3 1,561.5 934.7 584.2 530.2 192.6 3,803.2
Q4 1,569.5 948.7 593.7 543.7 195.1 3,850.7
Note: Data is obtained from SIFMA.10
to sell their municipal bond holdings, she will generally do so through a broker-dealer.
According to the MSRB, there were 1,312 broker-dealers registered with the MSRB as
of February, 2018. These broker-dealers have to report all trades to the regulator.5 The
municipal securities dealer will purchase the security from the current investor and sell
it to a new investor or another dealer. There are generally two types of investors in the
secondary municipal bond market: individual retail investors and institutional investors.
Retail investors are not the minority in this market. Table 1.1 shows that the majority of
holders of municipal debt are individuals and/or households. These individuals tend to be
high-net-worth investors in the highest marginal tax brackets looking to reduce their tax
burden.
1.5 INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: TAX EXEMPTION
Most municipal securities are exempt from federal, state, and certain local income taxes
while some munis are taxable if the federal and/or state governments deem the use of bond
proceeds to be of insignificant public value. Such triple tax exemption11 allows subnational
6Includes mutual funds, money market funds, closed-end funds and exchange traded funds.
7Includes U.S. chartered depository institutions, foreign banking offices in the U.S., banks in U.S. affili-
ated areas, credit unions, and broker dealers.
8Includes property-casualty and life insurance companies.
9Includes non-financial corporate business, non-financial non-corporate business, state and local govern-
ments and retirement funds, government-sponsored enterprises and foreign holders.
10Securities Industry and Financial Markets Alliance (SIFMA) Research and Data.
www.sifma.org/resources/archive/research.
5Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. http://www.msrb.org/BDRegistrants.aspx.
11Tax status of municipal securities is determined at the time of issuance.
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governments to borrow at a lower cost compared to other borrowers (e.g. corporations)
and provides investors, especially local residents, with attractive tax-exempt investment
options. Municipal bonds are attractive to various market participants, especially investors
in the highest marginal tax brackets, who are looking to reduce their tax burden.
Tax-exempt securities yield lower gross-of-tax interest earnings to investors. However,
investors are willing to accept lower interest in return for reduction in their income taxes.
Therefore, issuers are able to offer lower interest and save on borrowing costs. As an
example, Morgan Stanley’s website provides a simple calculator on its website to find the
taxable equivalent yield for tax-exempt securities.12 Based on this calculator, the investor
can estimate that a 5% tax-free yield for a Georgia resident in the top federal income bracket
is equivalent to a 8.81% taxable yield. This is a simple calculation and does not take into
account many other important factors. Nonetheless, tax exemption implies a significant
interest cost savings for most debt issuers.
Proponents of the muni tax-exemption policy argue that the federal government has an
incentive to provide federal income tax exemptions for subnational debt given that the state
and local government investment in public infrastructure fosters economic growth. Such
positive economic activity is likely to generate spill-over effects and benefit the national
government. The logic for state income tax exemption is the same. States may want to
forgo taxes on debt issued by cities and other subsidiary governments, in addition to their
own debt, to boost the local economy. The opponents of tax exemption, on the other hand,
argue that the economic benefits are either small, non-existent, or better achieved through
other means, such as direct subsidies to issuers.
The 1988 Supreme Court case South Carolina v. Baker ruled that the federal govern-
ment can tax the interest earned on municipal bonds [2]. Therefore, eliminating or limiting
the tax exemption of municipal bonds becomes a potential policy alternative in periods
of budgetary distress. For example, President Obama’s 2017 budget proposal included
12Morgan Stanley. morganstanley.com/wealth-investmentsolutions/municipalbonds.
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capping the exemption of interest earnings and President Trump’s 2017 tax reform plan
alluded to such limitations, which were later abandoned.13 The outcomes of such a policy
intervention, however, are not immediately clear. Proponents of similar tax expenditure
elimination/reduction policies argue that the federal and state governments forgo billions
of dollars due to lost taxes, and that tax collection on earned interest from municipal securi-
ties would be enough for the federal government to subsidize these public projects without
state and local governments falling back on debt financing. On the other hand, the oppo-
nents argue that eliminating or changing the exemptions may divert investors who currently
purchase and trade municipal bonds to other assets, thereby leaving issuers of municipal
debt in a precarious position. Consequently, state and local governments would either incur
significantly higher costs of borrowing or lose debt financing as an option. Even if the fed-
eral government did subsidize public projects as proponents have suggested, the opponents
argue that distortions from such a policy change may potentially outweigh the gains from
increased income tax revenues.
Since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 and resulting creation of the
federal income tax, the law has allowed interest on municipal securities to be tax exempt.14
There is, however, significant variation in the tax-exempt status of munis at the state level.
With a few exceptions of reciprocity, double exemption at both the federal and state levels
applies only to debt issued within the state of the investor’s residence. Theoretically, this
local flavor encourages resident investors to invest in municipal securities issued in their
own states. On the other hand, some states tax certain municipal securities only. Such
discriminatory tax policy complicates the analysis of the net effects of the tax exemption
policy on the issuers as well as the investors. Denison et al. (2009) provide estimates of
the revenue loss if the selected group of states were to exempt all municipal bonds from
tax calculations along with the potential revenue gains if the selected states instead were to
tax all munis [3]. The authors further analyze what might happen if all municipal bonds
13The 2018 tax reform eliminated private-activity bonds and advance refunding.
14Technically, munis were exempt before, the exemption just was not relevant until 1913.
8
are either exempt from state taxes in all states or taxable in all states. This type of analysis
focuses on revenue gains and losses and ignores investor decisions. A rational investor will
likely re-calibrate her portfolio if the tax treatment of municipal securities is changed or
eliminated, thereby potentially invalidating these revenue loss/ gain estimates.
State and local governments can issue taxable municipal bonds, such as private activity
bonds (PABs), by paying relatively higher interest to investors compared to exempt munis.
Forgoing the tax-exempt status gives the issuers more autonomy and frees them from ad-
ministrative and financial burden of abiding by numerous SEC regulations and IRS rules.
In recent years, given more stringent regulations, incentives to issue taxable bonds have in-
creased [4]. Issuing taxable rather than tax-exempt bonds, although more expensive, gives
the issuer a certain level of freedom in terms of private use and reporting which may be es-
pecially valuable to smaller issuers with less administrative resources. Further, if the issuer
is not completely certain about the use of proceeds in a project with many components,
some of which may not be of public value, that issuer may opt in for a taxable status as a
precaution.
It may seem surprising that investors choose taxable municipal bonds over tax-exempt
securities, especially given that the muni market is dominated by high-net-worth retail in-
vestors in the top income tax brackets. However, the muni market is rather diverse on the
demand side as well as the supply side. Some investors in the market gain little to no
benefit from the tax-exempt status. These include, but are not limited to, pension funds,
international entities, individual IRA accounts, etc. These investors simply utilize taxable
munis as a means to diversify their portfolios. To such investors, munis represent an al-
ternative asset class to Treasuries, U.S. agency bonds (Freddie, Fannie), corporate bonds,
etc. Although federally taxable, most taxable munis are generally exempt from state and
local income taxes. Furthermore, taxable munis should, at least theoretically, offer higher
interest than tax-exempt munis. Another appealing feature for some taxable munis is the
stronger protections from early redemptions compared to tax-exempt bonds through the
9
make-whole call feature.15
Cost (i.e. lost tax revenues) and benefits (i.e. growth of public infrastructure) of tax ex-
emption of municipal securities to federal and state governments and tax benefits accrued
to investors are not simple to estimate. Long-term and short-terms goals of the policy, as
well as the multifaceted impact on variety of stakeholders, both private and public, compli-
cate the analysis. Nevertheless, the importance and the size of the municipal market in the
U.S. capital markets warrants a closer look at the municipal bond market.
1.6 MARKET SHORTCOMINGS
The municipal bond market suffers from several shortcomings such as the lack of a
centralized exchange and shorting and less transparency compared to other capital markets,
such as the equity markets. Municipal bond trading is more expensive, transaction costs
have economies of scale in trade size, and trade frequencies for municipal securities do
not significantly affect transaction costs. Finally, most municipal bonds rarely trade in the
secondary market. Some researchers and analysts argue that these features are partially
to blame for the peculiarities and numerous puzzling phenomena observed in the market.
These unique aspects of the municipal bond market deserve some attention in this section
in order to provide context for the rest of the dissertation. An important characteristic
of the municipal bond market is that there is no centralized exchange or trading hours as
in the equity markets. Instead, trades are completed over the counter and investors trade
municipal securities through the brokers. The broker-dealers then purchase and sell these
securities among themselves in the inter-dealer market in addition to trading with retail and
institutional investors.
Shorting or short-selling is defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
as “the sale of securities that an investor does not own or has borrowed.” Shorting is rather
15The make-whole-call feature of a security eliminates the interest costs savings of refinancing for the
most part. Instead of being callable at par, for securities with this feature, investors are compensated at a
price which equals the present value of future interest payments. This is punitive for the issuer who would
otherwise benefit from early redemption.
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difficult and almost impossible in the muni market given the buy-and-hold nature of the
market, which makes most munis hard to come by. An alternative to shorting is to use
credit derivatives, such as the credit default swaps.16 This type of artificial shorting, how-
ever, is very small in the muni world compared to other derivatives markets. Nonetheless,
local government officials worry that such speculation from shorting will affect the investor
perception of their creditworthiness.
Over the last decade, the municipal bond market has innovated to move toward a model
that is as transparent and real-time as the equity markets. Although the municipal bond
market has not yet reached this goal, significant improvements have occurred over the
years. The SEC requires all transactions on corporate bonds and equities to be reported
almost instantaneously. The MSRB has implemented various rules and regulations to bring
the reporting on municipal transactions as close to this metric as possible. Since 2005,
all transactions (with a few exceptions) related to municipal bonds must now be reported
within fifteen minutes from the time of trade. These unique aspects of the muni market
present an interesting research environment.
16Credit default swap is a contract in which the issuer of a bond insures the buyer’s potential losses.
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CHAPTER 2
TAX EXEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL DEBT: HAS THE MUNI PUZZLE
DISAPPEARED?
12
ABSTRACT
Most municipal securities (munis) are exempt from federal, state, and certain local in-
come taxes. Eliminating or limiting tax-exempt status of municipal bonds becomes a poten-
tial policy alternative in periods of budgetary distress, given that this tax expenditure costs
billions of dollars per year to the federal government. This chapter estimates the implied
marginal tax rates associated with tax-exempt munis to understand the tax-reduction bene-
fits accrued to state and local governments. In this analysis, tax-exempt munis are matched
to near-identical taxable munis, which creates a unique quasi-experimental design. Results
of the random coefficients model (RCM), which accounts for issuer- and issuance-level un-
observed effects, show significant heterogeneity in implied marginal tax rates across issuer
types (e.g. counties vs. school districts) and over time. The longstanding muni puzzle, the
finding that interest on tax-exempt bonds is higher than the theory would predict, disap-
pears for general purpose government debt, once the nested structure and the product and
issuer heterogeneity of the municipal bond market are taken into account. Results imply
that municipal forms of government benefit the most from the tax exemption, while special
districts benefit the least.
Keywords: federal tax expenditure, subnational debt, municipal bonds, muni puzzle,
tax exemption policy, implied tax rate.
JEL codes: G12, G14, H5, H70, H71, H74.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Most municipal securities (munis) are exempt from federal, state, and certain local
income taxes.1 Such triple tax exemption allows subnational2 governments to borrow at a
lower cost compared to corporations and other institutional borrowers. On the other hand,
tax-exempt municipal securities are attractive to various market participants, especially
investors in high marginal tax brackets looking to reduce their tax burden. Given that the
federal and state governments forgo large sums of tax revenue due to the exemption policy,
a common concern is that issuers are not recouping the full benefits of the exemption. One
of the main concerns policy makers often express is that these benefits are accruing to
high-net-worth investors who dominate the muni market rather than sufficiently reducing
borrowing costs for debt-issuing governments.
Academic researchers have identified an inconsistency in what the theory predicts about
the interest costs on tax-exempt securities (in comparison to other taxable fixed-income
asset classes) and what is observed in the muni market. This longstanding finding that the
interest cost on longer-term tax-exempt municipal securities seems too high is commonly
referred to as the “muni puzzle.” The muni puzzle literature estimates that the implied
marginal tax rate associated with tax-exempt securities is about 20 − 25%, while theory
predicts an implied tax rate of about 35 − 39.6%, given the current highest corporate and
individual income tax rates.
This study tackles the muni puzzle in a novel way and estimates the market-implied
marginal tax rates associated with municipal securities. This estimate, in turn, can identify
interest cost reductions accrued to state and local issuers and tax reduction benefits accu-
mulated to investors. In this analysis, tax-exempt munis are matched to their near-identical
taxable counterparts, accounting for underlying idiosyncratic risks, investor preference for
1Some munis are taxable if the federal and/or state governments deem the project to be of insignificant
public value.
2Subnational governments are subsidiaries of the national government, i.e. all state and local (sub-
sovereign) governments. Debt issued by subnational governments is commonly referred to as municipal
debt. Tax-exemption status of municipal securities is determined at the time of issuance.
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municipal securities over other fixed-income asset classes and potential preference for debt
issued by specific issuers. Using the Random Coefficients Model (RCM) to account for
issuer- and issuance-level unobserved effects, my results indicate large heterogeneity in
implied marginal tax rates across issuers (e.g. school districts vs. counties) and issuances
(large vs. small, general obligation vs. revenue debt, etc.). The muni puzzle disappears un-
der more careful scrutiny, implying that borrowing costs for general purpose governments
would increase if the tax-exemption policy were eliminated or even capped.
This research is important for at least three reasons. First, the municipal securities
market, with $3.8 trillion in outstanding debt, is a significant portion of the U.S. capital
markets. Second, tax exemption of municipal securities is often on the chopping block by
Congress due to the mere size of the corresponding tax expenditures. Poterba and Verdugo
(2011) estimate that the federal government alone forgoes $14 billion in revenue annually
due to the exemption of interest income [5]. The muni puzzle implies that the federal and
state governments are wasting tax dollars by subsidizing subnational borrower’s interest
costs and that the benefits of the policy may be mostly accruing to investors. Thus, under-
standing the effect of the policy on borrowing costs through implied reductions in interest
costs (implied marginal tax rates) is a crucial next step. Third, the muni puzzle implies
that state and local governments may be paying too much in interest costs. Addressing
the puzzle, therefore, strengthens the stance that the subsidy (in the form of tax exemp-
tion) significantly lowers borrowing costs for state and local governments and encourages
investment in public infrastructure rather than only helping the rich [investors] get richer.
Contributions of this study are as follows: First, this study addresses the longstanding
“muni puzzle” for general purpose governments. Implied marginal tax rate is consistent
with the marginal tax bracket of a typical muni investor at around 33%. Results indicate
that the tax-exemption policy is effective in that it reduces interest costs significantly, con-
sistent with theory. Second, results show that there is significant heterogeneity in yields for
different types of issuers. School and special districts tend to get less interest cost reduc-
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tions on exempt debt compared to general purpose governments such as cities, towns, and
townships. Previous studies have not accounted for such issuer-type effects.
2.2 REVIEW OF THEORY AND LITERATURE
Access to tax-exempt debt financing by state and local governments is purely an Amer-
ican phenomenon. One of the benefits of this policy is encouraging investment in essential
infrastructure and public projects in the spirit of fiscal federalism. Due to this tax ex-
emption, state and local governments pay lower interest when issuing debt in the capital
markets compared to corporations and other institutional borrowers. Investors, in turn, are
willing to accept lower returns on exempt securities because interest income is not taxable.
Traditional asset pricing theory suggests that, in equilibrium, a marginal investor should be
indifferent between a taxable and an identical tax-exempt security if the following equation
holds:
yExempt = (1− τ)yTaxable (2.1)
where yExempt is the yield to maturity3 for a tax-exempt security, yTaxable is the yield to ma-
turity for a taxable security, and τ is the marginal tax rate for the marginal investor. There-
fore, if we observe that an investor is indifferent between tax-exempt security, yTaxable, and
taxable security, yTaxable, then this investor’s marginal tax rate is equal to tau, τ .
Almost all of the previous studies compare tax-exempt municipal securities to (taxable)
corporate bonds or Treasuries to estimate the implied tax rates associated with exempt
munis. However, municipal, corporate, and Treasury bonds have different underlying risk
3Given price, coupon rate (and therefore, coupon payments), and face value, the yield to maturity (the
offering yield), y, is determined based on the following formula:
Price =
T∑
t=1
Coupon Paymentst
(1 + y)t
+
Face Value
(1 + y)T
(2.2)
where T − t is the time remaining until maturity and T is the maturity date. The offering price is set by the
underwriters.
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and reward properties. Therefore, this type of apples to oranges comparison can introduce
serious bias. In general, taxable munis are considered to be less risky than corporate bonds
and other taxable securities. Munis also have a much lower default rate than corporate
bonds. The federal government, on the other hand, has never defaulted on its debt, whereas
subnational governments have very small but non-zero historical default rates.
A crucial observation for this paper is that state and local governments have the option
to issue taxable municipal bonds. Forgoing the tax exempt status gives the issuers access to
foreign and tax-exempt investors and frees them from administrative burden of abiding by
numerous SEC and IRS rules and regulations associated with issuing exempt securities.4
The IRS also regularly audits tax-exempt municipal bonds to assure compliance with the
Code. The IRS conducts about 400 audits per year, 25% of which results in non-compliance
and “taxability.” 5 In recent years, given more stringent regulations, incentives to issue
taxable bonds have increased. For example, many universities have shifted toward issuing
more taxable securities. The Bond Buyer (2016) article on Ohio State University debt
issuance presents an example [4]. Issuing taxable rather than tax-exempt bonds, although
more expensive, gives the issuer a certain level of freedom in terms of private use and
reporting, which may be especially valuable to smaller issuers with less administrative
resources. Further, if the issuer is not completely certain about the use of proceeds in a
project with many components, some of which may not be of public value, that issuer may
choose to issue a portion of the proceeds in the form of a taxable bond as a precaution.
It may seem surprising that investors choose taxable municipal bonds over tax-exempt
securities, especially given that the muni market is dominated by high-net-worth retail in-
vestors in the highest income tax brackets. However, the muni market is rather diverse on
the demand side as it is on the supply side. Some investors in the market gain little to no
benefit from the tax exemption of interest income. These include, but are not limited to,
4See the Post-issuance Compliance section of the IRS Publication 4079:
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4079.pdf. Accessed on: 01/26/2018.
5See the Treasury report at https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2012reports/201210087fr.pdf. Ac-
cessed on 02/27/2018.
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pension funds, international entities, individual IRA accounts, etc. These investors utilize
taxable munis as means to diversify their portfolios or as an alternative asset class to Trea-
suries, U.S. agency bonds (Freddie, Fannie), corporate bonds, etc. Furthermore, taxable
munis should, at least theoretically, offer higher interest than the tax-exempt munis.6
Additionally, municipal securities are more likely to have a “local flavor.” First, in-
vestors may have a preference for the state they live in and especially if they only benefit
from state income tax-exemption if they reside in the issuer’s state.7 Therefore, investors
have an incentive to buy and hold tax-exempt munis issued in their state to recoup the full
tax benefits of triple tax exemption (federal, state, and local, where applicable). Second, in-
dividuals may have different preferences for municipal securities than for corporate bonds
or Treasuries. They may feel more loyal to the locality they live in or be more confident in
that locality’s credit quality and wish to invest in local projects. Moreover, if the investor
has a preference for smaller forms of government, she may prefer her town’s bonds to state-
issued bonds. The caveat is that finding a credible identification strategy for the investor
behavior is difficult without information on investors’ portfolio composition. Nevertheless,
if investors in fact do perceive munis, corporate bonds, and Treasuries as different asset
classes, which is very plausible, then identifying the value of tax-exemption using the yield
spreads between Treasuries (or corporate bonds) and municipal securities is an invalid ap-
proach. Further, if investors have preferences for specific issuers (levels of government)
within the muni world, then state-issued bonds may not be the best comparison group for
debt issued by smaller municipalities.
Several studies have attempted to estimate the total monetary costs of the municipal
tax exemption policy accrued to the national government. Poterba and Verdugo (2011) es-
6Another appealing feature for some taxable munis is the stronger protections from early redemptions
compared to tax-exempt bonds through the make-whole call feature. The make-whole-call feature of a secu-
rity for the most part eliminates the interest costs savings of refinancing. Instead of being callable at par, for
securities with this feature, investors are compensated at a price which equals the present value of future in-
terest payments. This is punitive for the issuer, who would otherwise benefit from early redemption. Taxable
munis with the make-whole-feature are not common and are excluded from the final sample in this study.
7Local income taxes rarely apply to municipal bond interest income. It is not possible to identify the local
income taxes without a zip-code level investor portfolio data.
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timate that the federal government forgoes approximately $14 billion in revenue annually
due to the tax exemption policy [5]. Marlowe (2015) estimates that in the absence of the
tax exemption program, state and local governments would have paid an additional $714
billion in interest expense between 2000 and 2014 (or $48 billion per year) [6]. Marlowe
(2015) also shows that state and local governments invested approximately $400 billion in
various capital projects in 2014, and that nearly 90 percent of subnational government cap-
ital spending is debt-financed [6]. These studies imply that benefits of the tax-exemption
policy outweigh the costs to the federal revenue stream. However, these types of analyses
focuses on revenue gains and losses at the government level and ignores investor decisions.
A rational investor will likely re-calibrate her portfolio if the tax treatment of municipal
securities is changed or eliminated, thereby potentially invalidating these revenue loss/gain
estimates.
The Build America Bond (BAB) program, part of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, presented an interesting experiment. The BAB program
subsidized state and local governments for issuing taxable rather then tax-exempt munici-
pal bonds. Issuers received a subsidy in the amount of 35% of interest payments on their
taxable bonds issued within the 20-month period, although the subsidy was for the life of
the bond. Liu and Denison (2014) match BABs and general taxable bonds to tax-exempt
municipal bonds issued in California and find that the implied marginal tax rate for the
marginal investor is 25% [7]. Similarly, Luby (2012) estimates an implied tax rate of 24%
using two BAB transactions issued by the State of Ohio in 2010 [8]. However, California
or Ohio may not be representative of the entire muni market, and BABs may be perceived
as a special asset class by investors.
Given that BABs were a special asset class, I exclude these securities from my sample
and analyze issues spanning a 15-year period rather than the 20-month period when BABs
were in effect. My data captures issuers across the country of different types (states, cities,
counties, districts, etc.) rather than a single state issuer. Further, Liu and Denison (2014)
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use True Interest Cost (TIC) at the serial bond level rather than offering yields at the ma-
turity level as the dependent variable, losing an important level of granularity [7]. Further,
studies have shown that issuer and issue size affect TICs. Therefore, large issuers, such as
California, may fare differently than smaller and local government issuers in the market.
Finally, Section 2.3.2 describes why Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and fixed effects panel
regressions pose econometric issues when unobserved and time-varying issuer-level effects
are suspect.
The debate that interest rates on tax-exempt municipal bonds seems too high (the muni
puzzle) has been ongoing for decades. The finance literature has identified and attempted to
address this puzzle for a long time. To reconcile the higher than predicted yields on exempt
securities with financial theories, studies have explored default risk [9], call options [9],
low liquidity, tax-timing options [10], and systematic risk [11], among others as possible
culprits. The puzzle seems to persist in each of those studies. Only Wang et. al. (2008)
find marginal tax rates of about 32 − 33%, after examining the effect of liquidity, default,
and personal taxes on the relative yields of Treasuries and municipal bonds [12]. These
estimates are consistent with my results.
Atwood (2003) compares munis subject to AMT with tax-exempt municipal securities
and finds 25−30% implicit tax rate, asserting that the AMT system affects asset prices [13].
The author also compares a small sample of (less than 50) taxable municipal securities to
tax-exempt munis issued on two separate days (July 20, 2001 and May 1, 2002), matching
only based on maturity, and finds an implied tax rate of 34 − 35%. This approach has
the usual small and non-representative sample concerns (a few issuers, two days). Further,
because taxables are matched to tax-exempt securities only based on maturity lengths, the
taxable sample has different features (average credit ratings, call option, etc.) than the
tax-exempt muni sample. Merely controlling for specific features does not eliminate bias
concerns due to unobserved issuance- and issuer-level effects.
The investor profile and income tax rates have changed since the Atwood (2003) study
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[13]. Bergstresser and Cohen (2015), using the Surveys of Consumer Finances, show that
municipal debt holdings of households have changed significantly over time [14]. Despite
the increase in the size of municipal debt, ownership has shifted to portfolios of more con-
centrated investors. Further, the highest marginal income tax bracket was revised from 35%
to 39.6% in 2013, which is captured in my 2001-2017Q2 sample. Finally, taxable munis
are not a perfect benchmark for tax-exempt munis unless they have the same public ben-
efit features and same backing (general obligation verses revenue). Investors may behave
loyally to their community by investing in their local government or prefer debt issued for
a specific purpose (stadium bonds vs. higher education bonds) or a specific type of debt
(general obligation vs. revenue bonds).
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
2.3.1 Matching Taxable Munis to Tax-exempt Munis
Almost all of the existing research exploits the spreads between tax-exempt munici-
pal bonds and either Treasuries or corporate bonds to isolate the tax benefits of municipal
bonds accrued to investors.8 This study argues that such comparison is an apples to oranges
comparison and introduces serious concerns for bias. Methodology used in this paper uti-
lizes a near-identical matching of taxable and tax-exempt municipal bonds. Recall that not
all municipal securities are exempt from income taxes - a subset of the municipal bond uni-
verse does not have the typical tax exemption feature. Further, state and local governments
periodically issue taxable and tax-exempt munis with near-identical characteristics simul-
taneously. Comparisons within the same asset class (the muni world) yield a more accurate
estimate than comparisons to corporate bonds or Treasuries. The intrinsic difference be-
tween munis and other fixed income securities, at least through tax preference, strengthens
the justification for this matched comparison approach.
Furthermore, the matching technique takes advantage of bonds issued by the same gov-
8See Poterba and Verdugo (2011) for an example of this [5]
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$560,525,000 
State of Georgia 
General Obligation Bonds 2015A Maturity Schedule 
Maturing February 1, Principal Amount Interest Rate Price or Yield CUSIP (a) 
2016   $28,740,000 5.000% 0.190% 373384Y59 
2017 30,555,000 5.000 0.560 373384Y67 
2018 32,085,000 5.000 0.960 373384Y75 
2019 33,695,000 5.000 1.250 373384Y83 
2020 35,375,000 5.000 1.470 373384Y91 
2021 20,405,000 5.000 1.720 373384Z25 
2022 21,425,000 5.000 1.930 373384Z33 
2023 22,495,000 5.000 2.070 373384Z41 
2024 23,615,000 5.000 2.210 373384Z58 
2025 24,800,000 5.000 2.340 373384Z66 
2026 23,350,000 5.000 2.450* 373384Z74 
2027 24,515,000 5.000 2.560* 373384Z82 
2028 25,740,000 5.000 2.660* 373384Z90 
2029 27,030,000 5.000 2.760* 3733842A3 
2030 28,380,000 3.000 3.250 3733842B1 
2031 29,230,000 4.000 3.260* 3733842C9 
2032 30,400,000 4.000 3.310* 3733842D7 
2033 31,615,000 4.000 3.350* 3733842E5 
2034 32,880,000 4.000 3.390* 3733842F2 
2035 34,195,000 3.500 3.580 3733842G0 
*Priced to February 1, 2025 optional redemption date. 
 
 
 
$447,830,000 
State of Georgia 
General Obligation Bonds 2015B (Federally Taxable) Maturity Schedule 
Maturing February 1, Principal Amount Interest Rate Price or Yield CUSIP (a) 
2016   $30,050,000 0.300% 0.300% 3733842H8 
2017 30,345,000 2.250 0.760 3733842J4 
2018 30,805,000 1.250 1.250 3733842K1 
2019 31,420,000 1.750 1.750 3733842L9 
2020 32,050,000 2.050 2.050 3733842M7 
2021 20,880,000 2.420 2.420 3733842N5 
2022 21,405,000 2.670 2.670 3733842P0 
2023 22,045,000 2.780 2.780 3733842Q8 
2024 22,710,000 2.980 2.980 3733842R6 
2025 23,390,000 3.130 3.130 3733842S4 
2026 15,450,000 3.625 3.320* 3733842T2 
2027 15,960,000 3.875 3.570* 3733842U9 
2028 16,510,000 4.125 3.770* 3733842V7 
2029 17,100,000 4.250 3.900* 3733842W5 
2030 17,725,000 4.250 4.000* 3733842X3 
2035      99,985,000# 4.150         4.150 3733842Y1 
* Priced to February 1, 2025 optional redemption date. 
# Term bonds subject to mandatory redemption as described herein.  See “DESCRIPTION OF BONDS –
   Mandatory Redemption of 2015B Bonds” herein. 
Figure 2.1: Excerpt from The Official Statement of The State of Georgia (2015)
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ernment at the same time with the same features to identify the implicit tax rates. This
results in a final sample with a variety of debt products issued by a variety of issuer types
across the country. Such matching on security characteristics that are known to affect yields
provides a more accurate estimate of the relationship between taxable and tax-exempt
yields expressed in Equation 2.1 and removes underlying risk differentials and demand
differential for specific securities. In essence, this set-up approximates an experimental
design where the taxable munis are the control/comparison group. Another important ad-
vantage of such identical matching is that it guards the estimates against bias due to model
misspecification and allows to directly test the relationship in Equation 2.1.
Figure 2.1 provides a visual example of and justification for the matching technique
used in this study. The excerpt from the Official Statement (OS) of the State of Geor-
gia shows the parallel between taxable and tax-exempt maturities. Note that both Series
2015A and Series 2015B are general obligation (GO) bonds with the same issue date (July
9, 2015), interest payment frequency (semiannual), credit rating (Moody’s - Aaa, S&P -
AAA, Fitch - AAA), and maturity dates. As an example, consider the tax-exempt CUSIP9
373384Y67 maturing on February 1, 2017 with the taxable CUSIP 3733842J4 also matur-
ing on February 1, 2017. The tax-exempt security has a principal amount of $30, 555, 000,
a 5% coupon rate, and 0.56% offering yield. The taxable counterpart of this security has a
principal amount of $30, 345, 000, a 2.25% coupon, and 0.76% offering yield. Notice that
both of these securities are discount coupons (yield is lower than the coupon rate) and nei-
ther is callable. These securities are therefore, identical in every way except for coupon rate,
maturity size, offering yields, and of course the tax status. Using Equation 2.1, the offering
yields on the matched pair maturing in 2017 imply a tax benefit of [1 − 0.56
0.76
] = 26.32%.
However, such simple calculation does not account for coupon and price differentials or
issuer- and issuance-level unobserved effects and warrants a more rigorous empirical anal-
ysis.
9CUSIPs are unique security identifiers issued by the Committees on Uniform Securities Identification
Procedures (CUSIP) Bureau.
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Table 2.1: Matching Criteria for Tax-exempt and Taxable
Muni Pairs
1 issuer (name)
2 issue date (day, month, year)
3 maturity date (day, month, year)
4 coupon type (par, discount, premium)
5 security type (general obligation, revenue)
6 capital purpose (new, refunding)
7 bank qualification (bank-qualified, not bank-qualified)
8 call option (callable, not callable)
9 sinking fund type (sinking fund, no sinking fund)
10 insurance (insured, uninsured)
11 use of proceeds (see Table A.4)
12 credit rating (0-21 scale, average of all ratings)
13 sale type (competitive, negotiated)
14 state tax status (exempt only)
15 interest frequency (semiannual only)
16 debt type (bonds only)
As the example in the previous paragraph suggests, in order to eliminate underlying id-
iosyncratic risks and demand differences across different types of securities, taxable and
tax-exempt CUSIP numbers are matched based on the criteria described in Table 2.1.
Matching on issuer name eliminates the need to match on issuer specific characteristics,
such as state, region, issuer size, etc. Matching by issuer is important because it controls
for unobserved investor preferences. For example, investors may prefer California (CA)
bonds over New York (NY) bonds or city-issued bonds over state-issued bonds.Matching
criteria 14-16 in Table 2.1 are null since there is only one category for each of these criteria
in the final sample due to the exclusion criteria discussed in Section 2.4.2.
Note that matching utilized in this study is exact and one-to-one. If a taxable security is
matched to multiple exempt securities, then the match with the closest maturity amount is
kept. If the exempt security is matched to multiple taxable securities, again only the match
with the smallest maturity amount difference is kept. Eliminating duplicate matches for
taxable securities eliminates biased sample concerns.10 The matching technique described
10An alternate solution is to weigh the sample. However, identifying the correct sample weights presents
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above would result in five matches for the issuance displayed in Figure 2.1 - securities ma-
turing in 2017 and 2026-2029, highlighted in yellow. The rest of the maturities would drop
out either because of differing coupon types or call features. For example, the 2019 exempt
maturity is a premium coupon (coupon rate is greater than the offering yield) whereas the
2019 taxable maturity is a par coupon (coupon rate equals the offering yield).
In addition to coupon types (par vs. discount vs. premium), coupon rates matter as
well. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that investors have a preference for 5%
coupons regardless of the yield. Unfortunately, matching on coupon rates is not feasible, as
taxable and tax-exempt bonds tend to have different coupon rates. This level of restriction
on matching would result in an extremely small sample. Similarly, maturity size and total
offering size are not used as a matching criteria. Therefore, the difference in coupon rates,
maturity size, and issue size are controlled in the model. Finally, the representativeness
of this small matched sample in comparison to the full muni sample is addressed in the
Appendix.
2.3.2 Model
The tax rate at which the marginal investor should be indifferent between taxable and
tax-exempt municipal bonds is estimated using the Random Coefficients Model (RCM).
The RCM has several advantages over traditional regression models. First, it accounts for
dependency across observations - given that securities are clustered within issuances and
issuances are clustered within issuers, there are multiple sources of correlation. Second,
different issuers may have different idiosyncratic risks not captured by their issuance-level
credit ratings. Further, these issuer-level effects may change over time. The RCM can test
issuer heterogeneity and estimate issuer-specific effects. Finally, the RCM does not require
that the panel data be balanced. The primary muni market data is not balanced - some
subnational governments issue new debt every year whereas other issuers go to the market
its own challenges.
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less frequently.
The RCM is a more appropriate empirical strategy to identify, model, and leverage un-
observed, but important, heterogeneity in municipal securities. This modeling is, therefore,
a leap forward from the traditional empirical strategies used in municipal finance. Random
coefficient/ slope on the key variable allows the effect of this covariate to vary at multiple
levels (by issuer and by issuance). The levels/dimensions in this study are defined as secu-
rities within issuances within issuers. The logic for this type of nesting, as explained in the
previous paragraph, is driven by issuer- and issuance-level unobserved heterogeneity and
dependency.
The RCM utilized in this study can be expressed as:
yEijkt = (β1 + θj + λk)y
T
ijkt + β2Xijkt + β3Zijkt + ijkt (2.3)
where yE is the tax-exempt offering yield11 for ith security within jth issuance for kth issuer
at time t and yT is the offering yield for the taxable counterpart. The key variable of interest
is the taxable yield, yT , and the corresponding fixed and random coefficients at the issuer
and issuance levels.
The model does not include any intercept (fixed or random) in order to uniquely cap-
ture the relationship described in Equation 2.1. The βs capture the fixed effects coefficients.
These are the mean effects of each covariate in the population. The θ captures the unob-
served effects at the issuance level and the λ captures the unobserved effects at the issuer
level. Conditional on the covariates, these issuance- and issuer-level random effects are
equal to zero in expectation. Consequently, we analyze the variance of the random effects
by evaluating their point estimates and standard errors. Finally, Z is the vector of covariates
used in matching12 and X is the vector of additional controls.
11Offering yield is equal to yield to maturity at the time of issuance. Offering yield is equal to yield to call
for callable securities.
12Variables used in matching are included as covariates for several reasons. Matching on these covariates
only eliminates the main effects of the Zs. If there are indirect effects on yield between the Zs and the
tax/no-tax treatment, then there will likely still be a significant effect in the model. Further, note that I am not
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2.4 DATA
2.4.1 Data Sources
The data for this study come from the Municipal Securities Laboratory at the Andrew
Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. The primary database is Mer-
gent’s Municipal Bond Securities Database (MBSD) and is not available to the public.
This database contains the CUSIP numbers and issuance information, including issuance
and maturity dates, debt type, coupon type, capital purpose, use of proceeds, credit rating
and other enhancements, default information, original sale type, etc.13 Mergent database
includes a variety of information on more than 3.5 million securities. Issuer types are
manually identified by the author using the issuer names as the data does not contain such
classification.Variable descriptions, data sources, and covariate constructions are described
in Table 2.2.
A second dataset is the Municipal Market Analytics’s (MMA) market yield curve, also
a proprietary data not available to the public.14 The MMA’s municipal bond index is cre-
ated by surveying 38 institutions that represent dealer and investor opinion on daily muni
yields. The MMA’s median consensus yield scale is constructed for an AAA-rated, tax
exempt, callable, 5% coupon, general obligation bond for each of the 1, 2, 3...., 30 year
maturities on a daily basis since 2001. The MMA’s benchmark yield curve is used as a
proxy for prevailing municipal bond market yields. A market yield variable is constructed
by matching each CUSIP to the corresponding part of the MMA yield curve. Note that
MMA is available for weekdays only. If the issue date (dated date) of a security falls on a
Saturday, that observation is matched to the MMA yield from the day before (Friday). If
matching on the tax status (taxable vs. tax-exempt). Rather, I am matching on tax-exempt and taxable yields
which have significant between variation and matching only takes care of the within variation.
13Unfortunately, there is no information on credit upgrades/ downgrades in the database. It is plausible
that recent upgrades/downgrades and/or credit watches may have an effect on offering yields. These effects
are not known based on these data sets and are accounted for as unobserved issuer- and issuance-effects.
14I would like to thank Municipal Market Analytics, Inc., especially Tripp Kaiser, for allowing me to use
the MMA yield curve in this research.
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the dated date falls on a Sunday, that observation is matched to the MMA yield for the next
day (Monday).
The unit of analysis is a CUSIP. The time frame overlap among the three data sets
captures the 2001 through 2017Q2 period. In addition to data availability and overlap
within datasets, this 16-year time period provides a sufficient time period before and after
the Great Recession of 2008-2009.
2.4.2 Exclusion Criteria
The exclusion criteria are described in Table 2.3. These exclusions results in a 15%
reduction in the original sample size. Reasons for excluding these securities are as follows.
Section 2.2 explains why BABs are different and are therefore excluded. Variable rate se-
curities15 are complex and analyzing them is beyond the scope of this paper. Short-term
securities, with less than one year until maturity, are of limited quantity and are excluded as
a precaution. Further, the effect of tax-exemption on such short-term securities is likely to
be absent or very small. Securities subject to state taxes are excluded to avoid the confound-
ing effects between federal and state taxes. The last three exclusion criteria, criteria 6-8 in
Table 2.3, do not have a significant effect on the sample size and are excluded as a precau-
tion that demand may vary based on interest rate frequency and complexity features. After
matching taxable and tax-exempt securities, the final sample has five below investment-
grade security pairs that are also dropped as a precaution. These non-investment grade
(referred to as “high yield” in the industry) securities tend to attract a specific investor
pool. The final sample includes 6, 472 matched pairs or 12, 944 securities.
15These are adjustable, deferred, floating auction, floating, floating at floor, inverse floater, index-linked,
stripped, stripped convertible, stripped principal, stepped, or variable rate coupons.
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Table 2.2: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources
Variable Name Description and Measurement Source
Dependent variable
Tax-exempt Yield Yield offered to the initial investor Mergent
Independent variables
Taxable Yield Yield offered to the initial investor Mergent
Issuer Type Indicators for city, county, state, school district,
special district, and town/township
Mergent16
Coupon Difference Tax-exempt coupon rate - Taxable coupon rate Mergent
Price Difference Tax-exempt price - Taxable price Mergent
Size Difference (Tax-exempt issuance size - Taxable issuance
size) / 100,000
Mergent
Market Spread Tax-exempt offering yield - MMA yield Mergent,
MMA
Callable Indicator for call feature Mergent
Sinking Fund Indicator for sink fund Mergent
Credit Rating Average credit rating based on Moody’s, S&P,
Fitch, converted to a 0 − 21 scale with unrated
= 0 and 21 = best possible credit rating
Mergent
General Obligation Indicator for general obligation vs revenue debt Mergent
Insured Indicator for presence of insurance Mergent
New Indicator for new issuance vs. refunding Mergent
Time to Maturity Years remaining until maturity Mergent
Table 2.3: Sample Exclusion Criteria
1 BABs and any other debt types that are not bonds (notes, derivatives, etc.)
2 Variable coupon rates
3 Maturity length < 1 year (notes)
4 Securities subject to state tax or with state tax status missing
5 Capital purpose other than new or refunding
6 Interest rate frequency other than semiannual or at maturity
7 Securities with make-whole-call feature
8 Debt issued by U.S. territories and their subsidiary governments
16Coded manually based on Google searches of the issuer’s name.
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2.5 FINDINGS
2.5.1 Descriptive Results
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 provide visual demonstrations of the matching results. The
first panel of the Figure 2.2 shows that, with a few exceptions, as expected, the offering
yield for the taxable securities is higher than that of the matched exempt yield and lies
below the 45 degree line (dashed blue line). The exceptions above the dashed blue line
capture the observations where the offering yield for the exempt security was higher than
that for the taxable security. The observations above the 45 degree line imply a tax burden
rather than a tax benefit associated with these maturity pairs. There is no theoretical reason
why this should be the case. However, lack of market demand (under-subscription) for
specific securities may push the spread between taxable and tax-exempt securities upwards.
Coupon, price, and size differences may also contribute to the range of the spread.
The solid green line captures the theoretical indifference line for the marginal investor
in the highest income bracket of 39.6%. Recall that, due to exclusion criteria, none of these
securities are subject to state taxation. This indifference line corresponds to the following
equation: yExempt = 0.604ytaxable, where yExempt is the offering yield for the exempt se-
curity and ytaxable is the offering yield for its taxable counterpart. If there were no other
differences other than tax status (e.g. coupon differential, face value, issuer- and issuance-
level unobserved effects, etc.), theory predicts that all observations would lie on this solid
green line for the typical muni investor in the highest income bracket. If the average muni
investor has a tax rate which is lower than the highest tax rate, then the observations would
need be somewhere between the solid green and the dashed blue lines for these securities
to clear the market. Finally, there are a significant number of observations below the solid
green indifference line implying tax benefits above the rate in the highest tax bracket. This
warrants a more rigorous analysis to see if these relationships remain after adjusting for
coupon/size differentials and unobserved effects.
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Figure 2.2: Visual Representation of Matched Pairs
The sample contains par, original issue discount, and original issue premium bonds.
The maturity amounts for each pair are clustered in a relatively tight range as displayed
in the bottom right panel of Figure 2.2. Recall that the number of observations indicates
the number of CUSIP pairs, which implies a paring of about 13,000 individual CUSIPs.
Table A.1 in the Appendix provides the summary statistics for the final sample and shows
that the average coupon rate is 31 basis points higher for taxable securities than for exempt
securities. However, the coupon comparison panel of Figure 2.2 shows that this relationship
is not consistent and for a portion of observations - taxable securities offer lower coupons
than their tax-exempt twins. Of the 6,472 CUSIP pairs, 27% have call options attached to
them, 23% are insured, 48% are rated, 44% are new issues, 25% are GO, and only 4% have
a sinking fund feature. The average age of a matched-pair is about eight years.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the distribution of the naive implied tax rate, which is obtained
by comparing the offering yields of the matched pairs using Equation 2.1. The graph
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Implied Marginal Tax Rate, τ , Post-match
shows that the implied tax rate ranges from values above the theoretical range (35−39.6%)
extending into negative values, which imply a tax burden rather than a tax reduction benefit.
Such heterogeneity in the naive rates warrants a more rigorous approach and supports the
claim that a single point estimate for the implied marginal tax rates without accounting for
issuer- and issuance-level variation may be driving the muni puzzle.
Further, Figure 2.4 shows the variation in the naive implied tax rate by issuer type
(cities, counties, states, school districts, special districts, and towns/townships). Again, the
naive implied tax rate here is simply the binary relationship between matched taxable and
exempt offering yields based on Equation 2.1. The horizontal lines mark the 35% (solid
blue), 30% (short-dash pink), and 20% (long-dash green) tax rates, which are the highest
corporate income tax rate, lower bound of the effective individual income tax rate for a
typical muni investor, and typical estimate of the implied tax rate found in the literature,
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Implied Marginal Tax Rate, τ , Post-match, by Issuer Type
Note: Solid Blue=35%, Short-Dash Pink = 30%, Long-Dash Green = 20%
respectively. According to the box plot, the median implied tax rate is around 30% for
cities, counties, and school districts. However, implied tax rates are near 18% for special
districts, and at about 25% for states. This suggests that different levels of government
may be getting different levels of interest cost reduction benefits from the tax-exemption
policy. There is quite a bit of variation in tax benefits offered by various types of local
governments. School and special districts display the largest dispersion in the distribution
of the naive τ , the implied tax rate obtained from comparing matched yields. This level of
variation warrants a more rigorous empirical approach given that Figure 2.4 cannot account
for fluctuations over time. Final sample distribution of issuer types is displayed in Table A.3
in the Appendix.
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2.5.2 Empirical Results
First, Table 2.4 shows the generalized linear model (GLM) regression of the naive im-
plied marginal tax rate, τ , the binary relationship between matched taxable and exempt
offering yields obtained using Equation 2.1, on several important covariates, with standard
errors clustered at the issuer level. The key coefficient of interest in this model is the coef-
ficient on the intercept, which provides the population average for the implied tax rate, all
else equal. Model (3) in Table 2.4 shows an implied marginal tax rate of 22% for the refer-
ence group, a new, non-callable, uninsured, unrated, 10-year, general obligation security-
pair issued by a city in 2016, where the matched pair have no coupon, price, or issue size
differences (all covariates are set to zero). This estimate is consistent with previous esti-
mates in the literature. Positive coefficients on the covariates increase the spread between
the taxable and tax-exempt yields, thereby, increasing the implied tax rate. Model (3) in
Table 2.4 supports the claim that issuer type matters in estimating the implied marginal tax
rates. As issuer- and issuance-level controls are added, implied marginal tax rate estimates
increases. Issuer-type identifiers show that smaller municipalities such as towns-townships
incur the lowest borrowing costs (largest positive and statistically significant coefficient)
and special districts display the lowest implied tax rates.
Control variables not used in matching, coupon, price, and par difference, are designed
so that the intercept identifies the implied marginal tax rates in the absence of any differ-
ences between taxable and tax-exempt securities. Recall that the reference group is a new,
non-callable, uninsured, unrated, 10-year, general obligation security-pair issued by a city
in 2016 where the matched pair have no coupon, price, or issue size differences (all co-
variates are set to zero). Coupon difference is constructed by subtracting taxable coupon
rate from the tax-exempt security’s coupon rate. As the coupon difference increases by one
percentage point, the implied tax rate declines by 8 basis points. Price difference is con-
structed by subtracting taxable offering price from the tax-exempt security’s offering price.
As the price difference increases by one percentage point, the implied tax rate declines by
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Table 2.4: GLM Results, Dependent Variable = τ
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.22***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Issuer Type Reference Group = City
County 0.00
(0.01)
State -0.02
(0.01)
School District 0.01
(0.02)
Special District -0.05***
(0.01)
Town/Township 0.05***
(0.02)
Market Spread (MMA) -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
Callable 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Sinking Fund 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
Credit Rating -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
General Obligation 0.05*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Insured 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
New (vs. Refunding) -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Coupon Difference -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Price Difference 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size Difference 0.00** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Maturity Effects NO YES YES
Year Effects NO YES YES
Observations 6,472 6,472 6,472
R2 0.14 0.62 0.63
Issuances 1,138 1,138 1,138
Issuers 579 579 579
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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one basis points.
Issue size difference variable is constructed by dividing the difference between tax-
exempt and taxable par amounts by $100, 000.17 Previous literature has identified that
larger bonds are associated with lower borrowing costs. However, results here indicate that
the size of the issuance does not have a statistically significant effect on the yields (and
therefore implied tax rates), all else equal. Market spread variable is constructed by taking
the difference between the exempt offering yield and the corresponding part of the MMA
yield curve (same day, same maturity length). The more the exempt security deviates from
prevailing market yields, the lower the implied marginal tax rate. This implies that interest
cost reductions for tax-exempt securities are the highest when they can match the market
environment.
Table 2.4 supports the claim that issuer characteristics affects yields and therefore the
implied tax rates. However, an ordinary GLM model ignores issuer- and issuance-level
unobserved effects which may also vary over time. Therefore, to control for issuer- and
issuance-level unobserved effects, as explained in Section 2.3.2 and Equation 2.3, Table 2.5
presents the RCM estimates. In contrast to Table 2.4, the dependent variable in Table 2.5 is
the offering yield for the tax-exempt security. Model (1) accounts for only issuer-level un-
observed effects and Model (2) accounts for both issuer- and issuance-level effects. Models
(3) and (4) include additional covariates. The reference group is a new, non-callable, unin-
sured, unrated, 10-year,18 general obligation security-pair issued by a city in 2016 where
the matched pair have no coupon, price, or issue size differences (all covariates are set to
zero). Results in the final Model (4) show that a one percentage point increase in the taxable
offering yield results in a 67 basis points increase in the tax-exempt yield. This estimate
implies a marginal tax rate of 33%.
A confidence interval of [0.66, 0.68] on the key independent variable, THE taxable
17Taking logs would drop all observations where the difference is zero given that logs are undefined for
zero values.
18Results are robust to the inclusion of different maturity lengths as the base.
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Table 2.5: RCM Results, DV = Exempt Yield
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxable Yield 0.843*** 0.827*** 0.708*** 0.675***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Issuer-level (std) 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Issuance-level (std) 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
County 0.045**
(0.022)
State 0.047**
(0.022)
School District 0.081***
(0.022)
Special District 0.281***
(0.017)
Town/Township -0.033
(0.029)
Callable 0.032*** 0.018**
(0.009) (0.009)
Sinking Fund -0.066*** -0.063***
(0.014) (0.014)
Credit Rating 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
General Obligation -0.024** 0.182***
(0.009) (0.016)
Insured 0.002 0.004
(0.014) (0.014)
New (vs. Refunding) 0.027*** 0.012 ***
(0.003) (0.003)
Market Spread (MMA) 0.275*** 0.290 ***
(0.011) (0.010)
Coupon Difference -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Price Difference 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.111*** 0.104***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Issue Size Difference -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maturity/Year Effects NO NO YES YES
Obs (Security Pairs) 6,475 6,475 6,475 6,475
Issuances 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138
Issuers 579 579 579 579
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
37
yield, indicates an implied marginal tax rate of 32% to 34% with an additional 0.2 basis
point deviation by issuer and another 0.04 basis point deviation by issuance.19 Positive co-
efficients shrink the spread between taxable and tax-exempt yields, decreasing the implied
tax rates. Further, the results show that special districts are paying higher interest costs
than the rest of the issuers on their exempt debt, while cities, towns, and townships are re-
couping close to full benefits of the exemption policy. This is consistent with the argument
that investors may care about more than just a the immediate return on their investment and
prefer one issuer over another.
Recall that securities were not matched on price, coupon rate, or par value.20 Given the
deterministic relationship among yields, time to maturity, par value, and price, as shown
in Equation 2.2, the maturity amount is not included in the model. If the coupon rates on
exempt securities are higher (higher coupon difference), this is reflected in lower exempt
yields (negative coefficient on the coupon difference variable). If the price on exempt secu-
rities is higher (higher coupon difference), this is reflected in higher exempt yields (positive
coefficient on the price difference variable). Issue size differences do not have a statistically
significant effect on yields. Finally, the relationship between maturity lengths and yields
are not linear. Yields increase (non-linearly) as time remaining until maturity increases.
However, it is important to include maturity length effects rather than a continuous variable
for time remaining until maturity.21
Remaining control variables have the expected signs. Market yields have the expected
positive effect on tax-exempt offering yields. This is expected as interest costs tend to
rise with the prevailing market rates. Securities with a call feature have higher yields to
compensate the investor for the call risk. New issues have higher interest costs compared
19Variation instead of deviation can be obtained by squaring the standard deviations of issuer and issuance
effect.
20There are, in fact, 90 observations in the final sample with no coupon or price differences. In this small
subsample, the offering yield on taxable and tax-exempt securities is identical, implying a zero implied tax
rate. All of the securities in this small subsample are issued by special districts, however. The only plausible
explanation for this is under-subscription for the exempt securities.
21Coefficients on maturity length indicators are not displayed due to space limitation but are available upon
request.
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to refunding issues. Credit rating has a positive effect on exempt offering yields, but this
is mostly driven by the fact that 52% of the sample is unrated (credit rating coded as zero).
Results are robust to the inclusion of binary rated/unrated variable. These results confirm
that the level of heterogeneity in the municipal bond market should not be ignored.
2.5.3 Discussion
State and local governments may choose to issue tax-exempt and taxable securities si-
multaneously for regulatory reasons, to attract foreign and tax-exempt investors (e.g. IRA
investments), or simply because of habit. To qualify for a tax-exempt status, issuers have to
meet and comply with a multitude of IRS and SEC regulations and meet specific require-
ments. One caveat is that taxable and tax-exempt securities may attract different investors
with fundamentally different income tax profiles, such as foreign investors and mutual
funds, who want higher returns and have nothing to gain from the tax exemption of interest
income. Without access to data on investors’ portfolio composition, it is difficult to iden-
tify the exact tax benefits to each bond holder. Nonetheless, underwriters generally have
an idea of the profile of the potential investors and bid on new issues or work with issuers
to structure the debt accordingly. This study argues that assuming investors have access to
a pair of taxable and tax-exempt securities identical in almost every other way at the time
of issuance, the marginal investor reveals her tax preferences/burden if the debt clears the
market.
The value of the exemption to investors is just as important to take into account as the
subsidy to state and local governments. Bergstresser and Cohen (2015), using the Surveys
of Consumer Finances, show that municipal debt holdings of households have changed
significantly over time [14]. Despite the increase in the size of municipal debt, ownership
has shifted to portfolios of more concentrated investors - Bergstresser and Cohen (2015)
show that the share of households holding any municipal debt dropped from 4.6% in 1989
to 2.4% in 2013 but the share of total debt held by the top 0.5% of households rose from
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24% in 1989 to 42% in 2013 and the top 1.2% held more than 97% of all munis [14].
This shift in the holdings of municipal bonds into portfolios of the wealthiest households
implies that the benefit of the exemption is now more concentrated among the wealthiest
Americans. This is consistent with my findings that implied marginal tax rates are near the
top statutory rates. Bergstresser and Cohen (2015) also show that at least 30% of munis are
held by households with marginal federal tax rates above 35% [14]. These household level
estimates further support my findings of implied marginal tax rate of 32− 34%.
Another relevant point to this study is the difference between marginal and effective
tax rates. Due to the effects of various tax exemptions, deductions, and credits for a tax
payer within the current tax system, average (effective) tax rates tend to be lower than
marginal tax rates for the average taxpayer. An investor with a 25% effective tax rate may
be less inclined to give up 35% of potential interest income. However, the typical muni
holder is not an average taxpayer. Piketty et al. (2018) show that the all-inclusive effective
tax rate22 for the top 1% of Americans (whose average pre-tax income was 1.3 million
in 2014) ranged from 31% to 39% between 2001 and 2014, the time period used in my
analysis [15].23 These effective tax rate estimates for the top 1% coupled with the finding
that the muni holders are concentrated at the very top of the wealth distribution provide
strong support for my results, that implied marginal tax rates are between 32 − 34% for
municipal debt.
2.6 CONCLUSION
In a decentralized government like the United States, responsibility to invest in public
projects falls mostly on the shoulders of state and local governments. From a policy per-
spective, it is important to understand whether state and local governments are recouping
the full benefits of the federal subsidy through tax-exemption of municipal bonds. This
22Taxes on individual incomes, payroll, estates, corporate profits, properties, and sales.
23The implied average effective rate then would be 35%. See Piketty et al. (2018)’s Appendix Table G1
which is available on-line [15].
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study estimates the tax benefits of municipal bonds and finds that the answer is affirma-
tive for general purpose governments. The use of the entire bond universe data results in
a paired taxable and tax-exempt subsample which provides the necessary precision to ac-
count for the difference in underlying idiosyncratic risk and investor preferences. Results
of the Random Coefficients Model show that implied marginal tax rates are 32 − 34%,
which is consistent with theory. The muni puzzle, the previous finding that interest rates
on tax-exempt bonds are too high, disappear under more careful scrutiny. This implies that
if the tax-exemption policy is eliminated or even capped, interest costs for general purpose
governments will increase substantially.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF THE SECONDARY MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET ON
FUTURE COST OF BORROWING FOR SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
42
ABSTRACT
The primary market for state and local government borrowing receives great attention
yet researchers as well as subnational debt-issuing governments tend to ignore the sec-
ondary municipal bond market. However, if the primary market rewards issuers for the
favorable performance of their outstanding debt in the secondary market, then state and
local governments are neglecting an important piece of the puzzle - the potential to reduce
future borrowing costs. This study combines large proprietary databases of primary and
secondary market information to test whether the performance of existing debt in the sec-
ondary market affects future cost of borrowing for state and local governments. Results
show that fluctuations in the secondary market prices and yields impact future borrowing
costs. Further, the effect of the secondary market varies significantly by issuer. Findings
imply that the secondary market contains an additional layer of real-time quality informa-
tion not captured by other lagged metrics such as credit ratings.
Keywords: borrowing costs, municipal bonds, subnational governments, primary mar-
ket, secondary market, true interest cost (TIC), bond underwriting.
JEL Codes: G12, G14, H5, H70, H71.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
While underwriters, investors, and traders pay close attention to market activity in the
secondary municipal1 bond market in addition to the primary market, subnational govern-
ments tend to ignore the market performance of their outstanding debt. However, if the
primary market rewards favorable performance in the secondary market, state and local
governments are neglecting an important piece of information - the effect of the issuer’s
outstanding debt performance on future interest costs and the potential to reduce future
borrowing costs. This effect may be particularly pronounced in the wake of the recent
Great Recession of 2008-2009 as the faith in the lagged credit ratings by the “Big Three”
(Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch Ratings) as the measure
of creditworthiness has wavered.
Underwriters, who act as financial intermediaries between the debt-issuing govern-
ments and investors, have an incentive (earn fees) to quickly clear the market and therefore,
make pricing decisions accordingly. My informal interviews with Citigroup’s Municipal
Securities Division underwriters and traders suggest that the secondary market transac-
tions play an important role in the structuring and/or sale of new debt.2 Underwriters, at
both competitive and negotiated sales desks, pay close attention to issuer’s existing debt in
addition to similar issuances by other governments. Thus, secondary market activity can
be a valuable tool for estimating market demand, understanding investor perceptions, and
therefore, borrowing costs for state and local governments.
The purpose of this study is to estimate the extent to which price and yield fluctua-
tions of issuer’s existing debt in the secondary muni market affect future borrowing costs
in the primary muni market. Contributions of this study are as follows. A review of ex-
tant literature indicates this to be the first study to directly link the secondary market to
1The initial sale of new debt by state and local governments takes place in the primary municipal bond
market and any subsequent sales take place in the over-the-counter secondary market.
2Citigroup Global Markets Inc. ranks 1st for their market share in key municipal tax-exempt products.
The author would like to thank Joseph Geraci, Deputy Head of the Municipal Securities Division at Citigroup,
and W. Bartley Hildreth (the author’s dissertation chair) for organizing this site visit.
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future borrowing costs for state and local governments. The research design utilizes large
proprietary databases of issuance (primary market), trade (secondary market), and market
(public finance industry) information. Finally, the analysis focuses on multiple layers of
government and estimates the effects of the secondary market on interest costs for different
jurisdiction types.
Results show that better performance of the issuer’s outstanding debt in the secondary
market reduces borrowing costs for state and local governments. This implies that the
secondary market contains an additional layer of real-time credit quality information not
captured by other lagged metrics such as credit ratings. These findings have several policy
implications for debt-issuing subnational governments. Given that price and yield fluctu-
ations of existing debt are significant real-time predictors of future borrowing costs, state
and local governments may be able to save on borrowing costs by timing their debt issuance
based on the market performance of their existing debt. Further, such knowledge may pro-
vide issuers with leverage when negotiating with or requesting bids from underwriters or
underwriting syndicates. Reducing borrowing costs, in turn, is of significant value as it can
free up resources for other public goods and services.
3.2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
3.2.1 Borrowing Costs and Creditworthiness
Credit ratings were generally perceived as the primary measure of quality/ riskiness un-
til the 2008-2009 financial crisis (the “Great Recession”). Bond ratings assigned by major
rating agencies3 came under serious scrutiny in the wake of the Great Recession. First,
the Big Three were blamed for exacerbating the global financial crisis by assigning overly
optimistic credit ratings. Second, the “issuer pays” model, where the debt issuer pays the
fees and the investors can access the rating free of charge, is argued to introduce a conflict
of interest and is likely to alter the incentives of parties involved in the transaction. In par-
3Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch Ratings also knowns as the “Big Three.”
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ticular, one of the major concerns is that the rating agencies are likely to assign higher letter
grades to earn or keep the issuer’s business. Third, credit ratings are perceived as lagging
indicators. By the time a credit rating or rating change is announced, the information is al-
ready saturated into the market. It is plausible that these factors, which are likely to reduce
the influence of credit ratings on investor perception of creditworthiness, encourage market
participants, including underwriters, to turn to other, more reliable and more real-time met-
rics to measure credit quality. Perception of credit quality, in turn, is likely to affect future
borrowing costs in the primary muni market for state and local governments.
Further, municipal bond credit ratings by Moody’s and Fitch Ratings were re-calibrated
to the Global Rating Scales in 2010. This recalibration was intended to alleviate the stricter
rating standards for municipal bonds compared to corporate bonds. Kriz and Xiao (2017)
show that this recalibration increased borrowing costs (the spread between the yields and
the risk-free comparison group) for high quality municipal bonds by 15 basis points, im-
plying that a high credit rating no longer had the same indication of quality [16].
3.2.2 Financial Intermediaries
Bond-level determinants of borrowing costs are well studied. Early studies primarily
focused on bond characteristics and prevailing market rates as explanatory factors for the
variation in borrowing costs. These explanatory factors include market interest rates (e.g.
the Bond Buyer 20 Index), credit ratings provided by the Big Three, security types (e.g.
general obligation vs. revenue bonds), issue size, time remaining until maturity, presence
of bond insurance and other credit enhancements, various complex features such as call
options, sinking fund provisions, bank qualification, tax exemption status, etc. Park et al.
(2016) provide a nice summary of these control variables and the expected relationship
between each factor and borrowing costs [17]. In addition to these covariates, Guzman and
Moldogaziev (2012) find that the purpose of bond issuance also has an impact on borrowing
costs [18].
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More recent research has extended the list of factors driving borrowing costs as stud-
ies have shifted focus to more refined stakeholder characteristics, especially those of fi-
nancial intermediaries. Sophisticated market participants, such as underwriters and large
institutional investors, are more likely to keep the pulse of market activities than local gov-
ernments or non-institutional investors. Consider the private sector - Corwin and Schultz
(2005) explain that the information production for Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by un-
derwriters involves analyzing both comparable traded companies as well as current market
demand for new issues [19]. Similar strategies are employed by municipal bond underwrit-
ers/ underwriting syndicates.
The underwriting process deserves some attention here. Typically, underwriting com-
mercial banks purchase the entire bond issuance from the issuer at a discount4 and sell
these securities to the investors at the initial offering price. The difference between the
offer price paid by the investors and the price paid by the underwriter, also known as the
gross spread, compensates the underwriting group/syndicate for their services. Several
studies have focused on whether the method of sale (competitive vs. negotiated) makes a
significant difference in borrowing costs and have found mixed results. In a competitive
sale, the issuer requests bids from underwriters and accepts the best bid whereas in a nego-
tiated sale, the issuer works with a single underwriter or underwriting syndicate to structure
and price the debt. Most studies show that with sufficient level of competition, competi-
tive sales yield better interest rates for municipal borrowers [17], [20]. On the other hand,
a group of scholars argue that the negotiated bond sales establish a close relationship be-
tween underwriters and issuers and result in a more optimal outcome and lower borrowing
costs through a more exhaustive market search by the underwriter [21], [22]. In contrast,
Peng and Brucato (2003) argue that method of sale does not matter once you control for
selection bias, as issuers self-select into the most optimal method of sale [23].
4This constitutes the underwriting fee, which is generally around half a percent.
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3.2.3 Measures of Borrowing Costs
By design, each municipal bond series is comprised of multiple maturities with different
maturity dates, par values, offering prices, and offering yields, with the exception of term
bonds. Term bonds are a single security. An issuer may issue multiple bonds/series and
term bonds simultaneously. Therefore, offering yield for each maturity provides a proxy for
borrowing costs at the maturity level rather than at the series level and is more granular. On
the other hand, the primary measure of borrowing cost used in the public finance literature
is the True Interest Cost (TIC). The TIC discounts all future principal and interest payments
such that the present value of all cash flows equals the bond proceeds that the government
receives. Such internal rate of return measure is generally considered best practice and has
become the industry standard. TIC is only available at the bond/series level and not at the
maturity level. Both TIC and offering yield have been used to measure borrowing costs
incurred by debt-issuing municipal governments. For example, Schwert (2017) uses the
offering yield as a measure of cost of borrowing whereas Moldogaziev and Luby (2016)
only use the TIC [24], [25].
TIC, however, is not without its shortcomings as a measure of borrowing costs. Simon-
sen and Robbins (2002) argue that the TIC generally understates the real cost of borrowing
given that there is quite a bit of variation in terms of which costs are included in the in-
terest rate calculations across state and local governments [26]. Rating fees, bond counsel
fees, bond insurance, and advisory fees are generally not included in TIC calculations [26].
Nonetheless, the TIC is still one of the best measures of borrowing cost available since it
incorporates underwriting fees. For munis, the underwriting costs range from half a per-
cent to a full percent of the par value depending on the size of the issuance. Weitzman and
Kyler (2016) state that underwriters were making $4.64 per $1, 000 of face value in 2015
compared to $7.77 per $1, 000 in 1996 [27]. These fees are generally lower for larger bond
issues.
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3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND THEORY
How financial intermediaries, especially underwriters, gather and process information
is at the core of municipal bond pricing. Underwriters face some level of uncertainty from
the time they acquire the bonds from the debt-issuing government until all inventory is
cleared and sold to investors. Consequently, these underwriters face pressure to estimate
the demand as accurately as possible. If demand is overestimated, underwriters face the
risk of not clearing the market and inventorying the securities they failed to sell to poten-
tial investors. Given the declining reputation of credit rating agencies, underwriters may
seek other avenues such as the secondary muni market for additional and more-real time
information.
Further, competitive and negotiated bond sales provide underwriters with different time
lines. For negotiated sales, which is the most common sale type, underwriters have 2-3
months from the time they are selected until the final sale to evaluate the issuer, conduct
market evaluation, estimate the demand, and solicit to potential investors [23]. This pro-
vides ample time to evaluate the true credit quality of the issuer and price securities accord-
ingly. With competitive bid sales, the second most common offering type, the timeline is
much tighter. Issuers publish a notice of sale with a request for bids and the underwriter
who submits the lowest interest cost (highest purchase price) bid is selected. Underwriters
have at most a few weeks to prepare and submit a bid. This implies that for competi-
tive issues, underwriters do not have the same luxury of time as with negotiated sales to
determine issuer’s true credit quality. Thus, they may place even more weight on the sec-
ondary market information to estimate market demand and investor perception of issuer’s
true creditworthiness.
The underwriter’s timeline difference for negotiated versus competitive bids has sev-
eral potential implications. Negotiated sales may allow for better timing of issuance since
underwriters have more time and flexibility to evaluate market demand. If the underwriters
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rely more heavily on the secondary market signals under the competitive bid time con-
straint, the effect of the secondary market on interest might be stronger for competitive
sales than for negotiated sales. On the other hand, since the underwriters in a negotiated
sale have more time to incorporate all relevant information into the pricing decision, they
may rely more heavily on the secondary market information. Additionally, the time con-
straint may induce the competitive bid underwriters to make larger mistakes in estimating
the secondary market signals which would manifest itself in smaller effect of the secondary
market price and yield fluctuations.
A review of extant literature reveals a lack of studies considering the effect of the sec-
ondary municipal bond market on future borrowing costs for state and local governments.
If the secondary market contains information that could potentially reduce interest costs
for issuers, the relationship between the secondary market and the primary market is worth
consideration. This study argues that the mechanism through which the secondary muni
market affects primary market performance is through the underwriting process. Under-
writers have to provide additional certification of the issuer’s quality and I test whether
they do so by evaluating the secondary market signals of the issuer’s creditworthiness. One
strategy for estimating market demand is to look at the secondary market performance of
the issuer’s outstanding debt. If the underwriters use the secondary market performance to
estimate market demand, then it is plausible that recent transaction prices and yields may
have an effect on borrowing costs. This relationship may also be stronger and/or more
volatile for negotiated bids than for negotiated sales. Recall that there is a relative time
crunch for competitive sales between the time the issuer requests bids and an underwriter
submits a bid compared to negotiated offerings. This time crunch may reduce the effect of
the secondary market signals for competitive bids, as the underwriters do not have as much
time to analyze all available information as they do in negotiated sales.
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3.3.1 Theoretical Framework
In this paper, both the True Interest Cost (TIC) and the offering yields are used as the de-
pendent variables to measure borrowing costs. The theoretical framework employed in this
study falls along the lines of the traditional asset pricing theory. The theory dictates that,
in financial markets, demand for safer assets is reflected in higher prices. Consequently,
investors demand higher rewards (yields) for taking on higher risk and thus, issuers receive
lower prices for their bonds:
• Higher risk→ higher yields→ lower prices.
Therefore, all else equal, increasing prices and/ or decreasing yields of the issuer’s existing
debt in the secondary market can be interpreted as a signal of higher demand and lower risk.
The following hypotheses are tested to tease out whether the data support these claims:
H1: Increasing yields in the secondary market increase borrowing costs in the future
periods.
H1 Corollary: Decreasing prices in the secondary market increase borrowing costs in
the future periods.
H2: The secondary market effect is stronger for negotiated sales than for competitive
sales, since the underwriters have more time to incorporate all information into pricing
decision.
Hypotheses H1 and H1 Corollary are essentially testing the same thing. If yields are
going up, prices should decline, all else equal. Conversely, if yields are decreasing, prices
should increase signaling higher demand and therefore increase the probability of reduced
borrowing costs. Rejection of H2, on the other hand, would imply that competitive sale
underwriters rely more heavily on secondary market information, given they do not have
the luxury of getting to know the issuer as closely as the negotiated sale underwriters. The
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next section outlines the key measures and how these hypotheses are translated into an
empirical model.
3.3.2 Key Covariates
To examine the effect of the secondary market performance on borrowing costs, mea-
sures of average monthly trade price and trade yield performance in the previous period are
computed. For models with the offering yield as the dependent variable, key factors are
defined as follows:
Trade Yieldikt =
∑S
s=1 (yikts − oyik)
S
(3.1)
Trade Priceikt =
∑S
s=1 (pikts − opik)
S
(3.2)
where i identifies the security, j is the issuer, t is the calendar month, y indicates the trade
yield, oy indicates the offering yield, p is trade price, op is offering price, and S is the
number of trades in the calendar month for debt issued by the same issuer with the same
time remaining until maturity. These measures track the transaction-level deviations from
the offering yield. Time remaining until maturity is important for investors with different
investment horizons. Further, time to maturity directly affects yields by definition and is
therefore indirectly controlled for by matching on time remaining until maturity.
For models with TIC as the dependent variable, the secondary market yield and price
performance have to be aggregated from the security level to the bond level - the TIC is
only available at the bond/ series level. To aggregate the market performance to bond level,
previous period yield and price measures in Equation 3.1 and Equation 3.2 are weighted by
the new security’s maturity amount as a share of the bond’s total par value, so that:
Weightij =
mij
Pj
(3.3)
where i identifies a specific maturity within series j, m is the maturity amount and P is
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the total par value of the new bond issued in the primary market. Such weighting by size
ensures that an appropriate weight is given to securities of different sizes when measuring
the effect of secondary market price and yield fluctuations. Essentially, this weighting
mechanism constructs a comparison group for the new issue from the issuer’s outstanding
securities with similar maturity horizons.5
3.3.3 Model
For models where the offering yield is the dependent variable, a Random Coefficients
Model (RCM) is estimated to analyze the effect of the secondary market on future cost of
borrowing. The RCM has several advantages. First, it accounts for dependency across ob-
servations. There are multiple sources of correlation - securities are clustered within bonds
which are clustered within issuances and issuances are in turn clustered within issuers. Dif-
ferent issuers may have different idiosyncratic risks that change over time, potentially more
frequently than their credit ratings. Similarly, there may be issuance-level unobserved ef-
fects which may induce security-level dependency. In this case, the estimates from simple
regressions that do not account for such nesting will be biased and unreliable. Finally, the
RCM does not require that the panel data be balanced.
The RCM is a more appropriate empirical strategy to identify, model, and leverage
unobserved but important heterogeneity among various municipal securities. Random co-
efficients/ slopes allow each covariate of interest to vary at multiple levels. The three levels/
dimensions in this study are defined as securities within issuances within issuers. The logic
for this type of nesting, as explained in the previous paragraph, is driven by issuer- and
issuance-level unobserved heterogeneity and dependency. The three-level random coeffi-
5A less conservative methodology for estimating the effect of the secondary market on future cost of
borrowing would be to expand the price and yield factors to all similar maturities trading in the market by
all issuers rather than the matching by issuer’s own debt. This strategy significantly increases the sample
size since there are more comparable securities in the market by all issuers than one specific issuer but also
introduces concerns about inference due to underlying risk differences across different issuers.
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cients model can be expressed as:
oyijkt = α + (β1 + θj + λk)Trade Yieldijk,t−1 (3.4)
+ β2Trade Priceijk,t−1 + β3Xijkt + ijkt (3.5)
where oyijkt is the offering yield for ith security within jth issuance within kth issuer at
time t.6
The key covariates are defined in Section 3.3. The Trade Yieldijk,t−1 variable measures
the average trade yield deviations from the offering yields for the issuer’s other outstanding
securities in the previous period. Trade Priceijk,t−1 measures the average trade price devia-
tions from the offering prices for the issuer’s other outstanding securities in the previous pe-
riod. Note that, theoretically, trade yields and trade prices should be negatively correlated.
As prices increase, yields should decline given the bond price formula in Equation 2.2.
However, the relationship is not deterministic and can vary by trade size. Therefore, both
price and yield movements are accounted for in the model.
The βs capture the fixed effects. These are the mean effects of each covariate in the
population. θ and λ capture the random parts of the coefficient that display cluster-level
unobserved effects. The θ captures the variation by issuance and λ captures variation by
issuer. Conditional on the covariates, each random effect is equal to zero in expectation.
Consequently, we analyze the variance of each random effect by evaluating their point
estimates and standard errors. Thus, there are three coefficients on the Trade Yieldijk,t−1
variable. The first one, β1, measures the mean population effect of the key variable, the
second one, θj measures the variation by issuance, and the third one, λk, measures the
6Similarly, we can analyze the effect of average trade price deviations of similar maturities on offering
prices:
opijkt = α+ (β1 + θj + λk)Trade Priceijk,t−1 + β2Trade Yieldijk,t−1 + β3Xijkt + ijkt (3.6)
where opijkt is the offering price and the rest of the variables are same as before.
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variation by issuer.7 The vector Xijkt includes issue-, issuer-, and market-level controls as
described in Table 3.1.
For models where TIC is the dependent variable, the following panel fixed-effects
model is estimated:
TICit = α + β1Trade Yieldi,t−1 + β2 Trade Pricei,t−1 + βkXkt + αi + it (3.7)
where α is the intercept, αi is the issuer-level unobserved effects, and it represents the error
term. The dependent variable is the True Interest Cost (TIC) at the bond level, which mea-
sures the borrowing cost the issuer incurs in the primary market in period t. See Section 3.3
for the definition of the key independent variables at the series level.
3.4 DATA
This study uses large databases of primary and secondary municipal market informa-
tion currently not available to the public. The data for this study come from the Municipal
Securities Laboratory at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State Uni-
versity. The primary market data includes all initial issuance-level information. The sec-
ondary market data includes information on all transactions following the issuance. Anal-
ysis is conducted at the security level for models where the offering yield is the dependent
variable and at the bond level where TIC is the dependent variable. Recall that the offering
yield is available at the maturity level, whereas the TIC is available only at the bond level.
Primary and secondary market data are matched by issuer name and CUSIP identifiers.8
Municipal bonds, with the exception of term bonds, are issued in multiple increments (ma-
turities) at different prices with different amounts, maturity dates, coupon rates, and CUSIP
7Note that it does not make much sense to add issuance level random effects if there is no variation at the
security level.
8CUSIPs are unique security identifiers issued by the Committees on Uniform Securities Identification
Procedures (CUSIP) Bureau.
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numbers.9 CUSIP-level analysis, therefore, is more granular than bond-level analysis.
3.4.1 Primary Market Data
The primary market data is obtained from IPREO, Inc and Mergent Inc. These are
proprietary data sets not available to the public. The IPREO database contains the true
interest cost (TIC) variable. The data also includes other issuance level information such as
issuer name, issuer state, issuance and maturity dates, coupon codes, total debt outstanding,
population size, etc. The data used in this study covers issuances in years 2005 through
2016. Due to the nature of the market, the TIC variable is available only for competitive
issues in the IPREO data set.
Mergent’s Municipal Bond Securities Database (MBSD) provides a rich set of covari-
ates at the maturity and bond levels. This database contains the CUSIP numbers and is-
suance information, including issuance and maturity dates, debt type, coupon type, capital
purpose, use of proceeds, credit rating and other enhancements, default information, orig-
inal sale type, etc. The Mergent data includes a variety of information on more than 3.5
million securities. Issuer types are manually identified by issuer names as the data does not
contain such classification. Variable descriptions and covariate constructions are described
in Table 3.1.
3.4.2 Secondary Market Data
Daily historical transaction data is obtained directly from the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board (MSRB). MSRB is a regulatory organization under the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) which writes rules for broker-dealers and banks. Each ob-
servation of the MSRB data contains the CUSIP numbers, transaction date and time, trade
price and yield, trade amount, and whether the trade was a sale to a customer (investor),
purchase from a customer, or an inter-dealer trade. The data also has an indicator for
9For example, a municipality may issue a $1 million bond comprised of 10 CUSIPs, with the first maturity
in the amount of $100, 000 maturing in one year, $100, 000 maturing in two years, and so forth.
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Table 3.1: Variable Descriptions and Data Source
Variable Name Description and Measurement Source
Dependent variables
Offering Yield Yield offered to the initial investor Mergent
True Interest cost (TIC) Series level internal rate of return IPREO
Independent variables
Trade Yield See Section 3.3 MSRB
Trade Price See Section 3.3 MSRB
Issuer Type Indicators for city, county, state, school
district, special district, and town/
township
Mergent10
Credit Rating Score Average credit rating based on
Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, converted to a
0 − 21 scale with unrated = 0 and
21 = best possible credit rating
Mergent
Coupon Rate Coupon paid to the investor Mergent
Call Option Indicator for call feature Mergent
Bank Qualified Indicator for bank qualification11 Mergent
Sinking Fund Indicator for sink fund Mergent
Insured Indicator for presence of insurance Mergent
ln(Issue Size) Natural logarithm of the total offering
size
Mergent
New (vs. Refunding) Indicator for new issuance vs. refund-
ing
Mergent
Market Yield (MMA) The MMA yield curve MMA
Market Yield (BBI20) The Bond Buyer 20 Index The Bond Buyer
Time to Maturity Years remaining until maturity Mergent
whether the transaction was the initial sale. Initial sales are dropped from the secondary
10Coded manually based on Google searches of the issuer’s name.
11Like other investors, commercial banks purchase munis to benefit from tax-exempt features of public
debt. Until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), banks were the major holders of municipal bonds [28].
The passage of TRA86, now under section 265(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, altered the banks’
demand for municipal securities by essentially eliminating tax benefits for banks (with a few exceptions).
The bank-qualified designation allows banks to deduct a portion of the interest expense for the purchase
and holding of municipal obligations. Under TRA86, bonds can be classified as bank-qualified (“qualified
tax-exempt obligation”) if the debt is (1) issued by a qualified small government issuing no more than $10
million of tax-exempt securities, (2) issued for public purposes, and (3) and designated as qualified tax-
exempt obligation. Consequently, issues sold after August 6, 1986 have two designations: bank-qualified and
non-bank-qualified securities. Banks are willing to accept lower returns on bank-qualified issues due to the
tax benefits. Bank-qualified issues reduce interest costs for small issuers and provide attractive tax benefits
for commercial banks.
57
market data. The data used in this study covers trades in years 2005 through 2015.
3.4.3 Market Conditions Data
The third dataset is obtained from the Municipal Market Analytics (MMA).12 The
MMA’s benchmark is used as a proxy for prevailing market yields and represents dealer
opinion on daily muni yields. The MMA data more is granular than other market indexes
as it is constructed separately for each maturity. The MMA yield is created by surveying
38 institutions. The MMA’s median consensus yield scale is constructed for a triple A, tax
exempt, callable, 5% coupon GO bond for each of the 1, 2, 3...., 30 year maturities. The
MMA benchmark is constructed daily and separately for each maturity. Thus, each bond
issuance is matched to a corresponding part of the MMA curve based on the issuance date
and time left until maturity.
The Bond Buyer 20 Index is used as a proxy for the overall market conditions for
the models with bond/series as the unit observation. Since the unit of analysis is a series
rather than a maturity, the maturity-level market proxy (MMA) is not needed for the TIC
analysis. The BBI20 index is obtained from the The Bond Buyer website and is available
to the public.
3.4.4 Exclusion Criteria
Using the primary market data, the sample is restricted to competitive and negotiated
issues due to the nature of the research question and data availability - offering types that are
classified as limited, private placement, remarketing, or missing are removed. Debt types
other than bonds, such as notes, derivatives, etc. are excluded. Issues with variable coupon
rates are removed.13 Analysis is restricted to new and refunded securities - observations are
12The author would like to thank Municipal Market Analytics, Inc. (MMA), an independent research firm,
and especially Tripp Kaiser, for allowing me to use the MMA yield curve in this research.
13More specifically, these are adjustable, deferred, floating auction, floating, floating at floor, inverse
floater, index-linked, stripped, stripped convertible, stripped principal, stepped, or variable rate coupons.
Analyzing variable rate issues and the impact of rate changes on borrowing costs are beyond the scope of this
paper.
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excluded if capital purpose is listed as remarketing/convertible, cross-over refunding, sale
canceled, restructured debt, or municipal forward. The sample is further restricted to tax-
exempt (federal and state) general obligation debt. General Obligation (GO) security types
included in this study are limited GOs, unlimited GOs, and double-barreled obligations.
Revenue bonds are excluded due to the fact that information on the revenue source/ risk is
not available and will likely have an impact on borrowing costs. Below investment-grade
securities and securities with less than one year until maturity are removed as well. Finally,
debt issued by territories and their subsidiary governments are discarded as a precaution. In
the secondary market data, trades are limited to customer purchases only to avoid concerns
due to dealer-level interactions. Trades are limited to secondary trades only and initial sales
are removed.
3.5 FINDINGS
3.5.1 Maturity-level Results
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show the results of the RCM model for competitive and ne-
gotiated sales, respectively. Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in the
Appendix in Table B.1 and Table B.2. The model is estimated separately for competitive
and negotiated samples to avoid the method of sale selection bias. Results indicate that
the secondary market trade yield fluctuations have a positive effect on future borrowing
costs. A one percentage point increase in trade yields of comparable outstanding securities
increases future borrowing costs by 1.7 basis point for competitive sales and by 3.4 basis
points for negotiated sales. The effect of the secondary market price and yield fluctuations
are larger for negotiated sales than competitive sales and the difference in the coefficients
is statistically significant (p = 0.0007). This is consistent with the fact that in negotiated
sales underwriters have more time to incorporate all available information into bond prices,
including the secondary market signals. This supports the claim that, in negotiated sales,
underwriters are able to better incorporate market signals into pricing decisions as they
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Table 3.2: RCM, Negotiated Sales, DV = Offering Yield
Trade Yieldt−1 0.036*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.004)
Trade Pricet−1 -0.007*** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000)
Issuer Variation 0.079 0.020 0.079
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Issuance Variation 0.148 0.032 0.147
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
County -0.058*** -0.064*** -0.058***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
State -0.113*** -0.128*** -0.113***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
School District -0.005 -0.002 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Special District 0.063*** 0.027*** 0.063***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Town/Township -0.086*** -0.064*** -0.085***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Credit Rating -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coupon rate -0.084*** -0.079*** -0.084***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Call Option -0.116*** -0.121*** -0.116***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Bank Qualified -0.076*** -0.052*** -0.076***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Sinking Fund -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.039***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Insured 0.078*** 0.105*** 0.078***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(Issue Size) -0.000 0.004 *** -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
New (vs. Refunding) 0.072*** 0.060*** 0.072***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Market Yield (MMA) 0.973*** 1.004*** 0.973***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant YES YES YES
Maturity/Year effects YES YES YES
Issuers 3,837 3,837 3,837
Issuances 8,033 8,033 8,033
Observations 43,304 43,304 43,304
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: RCM, Competitive Sales, DV = Offering Yield
Trade Yieldt−1 0.019*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003)
Trade Pricet−1 -0.004*** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000)
Issuer Variation 0.113 0.028 0.114
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Issuance Variation 0.118 0.034 0.118
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
County -0.019*** -0.034*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
State 0.046*** 0.026*** 0.046***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
School District 0.045*** 0.030*** 0.045***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Special District 0.204*** 0.146*** 0.204***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Town/Township -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.037***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Credit Rating 0.000* 0.001*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coupon rate -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Call Option -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Bank Qualified -0.099*** -0.073*** -0.099***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Sinking Fund -0.055*** -0.070*** -0.055***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Insured 0.105*** 0.128*** 0.105***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(Issue Size) -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New (vs. Refunding) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Market Yield (MMA) 0.894*** 0.925*** 0.895***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant YES YES YES
Maturity/Year effects YES YES YES
Issuers 4,310 4,310 4,310
Issuances 12,010 12,010 12,010
Observations 61,828 61,828 61,828
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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have more time to evaluate the issuer’s creditworthiness and investor demand.
The random part of the model shows that there are large issuer- and issuance-level vari-
ations in the effect of the secondary market yields on future borrowing costs. Issuance-level
variation is much larger than variation by issuer. The standard deviation of the issuance-
level effect is about 15 basis points, implying that the trade yield effect can vary by 2.2
basis points (0.1472 = 0.022) depending on the specific issuance. Similarly, the standard
deviation of the issuer-level effect is about 8 basis points, implying that the trade yield ef-
fect can vary by about 1 basis points (0.0792 = 0.006) depending on the issuer. In terms
of the effect on the borrowing costs, trade price and yield fluctuations have the expected
negative relationship. Although very small, increasing market prices have a negative effect
on borrowing costs as hypothesized. The effect of the secondary market price fluctuations
shrinks once the yield fluctuations are accounted for.
Another interesting set of results are revealed by issuer-type indicators. For negotiated
sales, states incur the lowest interest costs and special districts fare worse than any other
level of government. Borrowing costs for towns, townships, and counties in negotiated
sales are slightly higher than that of states but still lower than borrowing costs of cities
(the reference group). The yields are statistically the same for cities and school districts.
Special districts are the worst performers. States perform much more favorably in negoti-
ated sales than in competitive sales. For competitive sales, offering yields are the lowest
for smaller municipalities such as towns, townships, and counties. Borrowing costs are
comparable for states and school districts in competitive sales as they pay slightly higher
offering yields than cities. Special districts are paying highest borrowing costs compared
to all other governments both in negotiated and competitive sales. Investor preference and
heightened demand for more locally decentralized general purpose government debt may
partially explain why smaller municipalities such as towns or townships generally perform
better in terms of interest costs than special districts.
Control variables provide additional insights. An interesting result is that credit rat-
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ings do not have a statistically significant effect, which supports the argument for more
real-time credit quality metrics. This is plausible given the declining faith in rating agen-
cies following the Great Recession of 2008-2009. These findings provide further support
for one of the main claims of this study that investors and the market base decisions on
more real-time metrics of creditworthiness. Previous studies have argued that larger issues
benefit from economies of scale and incur lower borrowing costs given that large issues
tend to be issued by larger governments with lower idiosyncratic risks. However, offering
size seems to be beneficial only in competitive sales based on my results. New issues pay
higher borrowing costs in negotiated sales, whereas capital purpose does not have a statis-
tically significant effect in competitive sales. The remaining covariates have the expected
signs across both models. Maturity-matched market yields have the expected positive and
almost an one-to-one relationship with yields, which is consistent with the fact that bor-
rowing costs correspond to prevailing market yields. As a robustness check, the effect of
secondary market performance on issue prices is given in the Appendix in Table B.7.
3.5.2 Series-level Results
Table 3.4 shows the panel fixed effects results with True Interest Cost (TIC) as the de-
pendent variable for competitive issues only. Similar to the RCM models with the offering
yield as the dependent variable, the positive relationship between the secondary market
performance and next-period borrowing costs are confirmed. Recall that TIC is only avail-
able for competitive issues in the IPREO data.14 Higher trade yields in the previous period
are associated with higher borrowing costs in the next period. As the weighted trade yield
performance on existing debt of the issuer with similar maturity structure increases by one
percentage point, the issuer’s borrowing cost (TIC) in the next month increases by 1.4
14Note that panel fixed effects model, by design, does not allow multiple TICs per unit of time (days).
Therefore, issuers which issued multiple bonds at once were dropped from the analysis. TIC level analysis,
although costly in terms of sample size, is important because it incorporates additional interest cost parame-
ters (e.g. underwriting fees, etc.) that offering yields analysis ignores. This model restriction results in some
sample size reduction - 865 observations are lost. Therefore, as a robustness check, RCM model is also run
on this full sample and the results remain the same.
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Table 3.4: Panel Fixed Effects, Competitive Sales, DV = TIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade Yieldi,t−1 1.20*** 1.36***
(0.13) (0.15)
Trade Pricei,t−1 -0.06** 0.06**
(0.03) (0.03)
ln(Total Debt) 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Population) 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(Issue Size) -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Market yield (BBI20) 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.65*** 0.60***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant -5.75*** -4.74*** -5.58*** -4.77***
(0.70) (0.68) (0.70) (0.68)
Bonds 6,863 6,863 6,863 6,863
R2 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.73
Issuers 2,732 2,732 2,732 2,732
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the issuer level.
percentage points, all else equal. The magnitude of the relationship should be interpreted
with caution as the yield fluctuations measure is weighted. The sign of the relationship
here is more important. These estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that the pri-
mary municipal bond market rewards, whether directly or indirectly, the secondary market
performance. Results are robust to the definition of periods and inclusion of additional
periods.
The effect of trade prices on borrowing costs is small and only statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level. The small and insignificant relationship should not be surprising as
trade yields calculations incorporate prices by definition (See Equation 2.2). In Model (3),
the relationship between the secondary market and next-period borrowing costs, although
small, is negative as hypothesized. However, this negative relationship is reversed once
the secondary market yield is added in to the specification in Model (4). The magnitude is
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still vary small given the wide range of secondary market trade price fluctuations shown in
Table B.8.
Control variables provide additional insights. Given that the TIC is measured at the
series level, the model only includes issuance- and issuer-level controls.15 Issuer-level
controls included in Models (2)-(4) are measures for issuer’s total outstanding debt and
population size. These variables are provided in the IPREO database for competitively-
sold issues. Debt burden has the expected positive sign. As the issuer’s total debt increases
(borrowing and repayment capacity decreases), borrowing costs increase. Issuer size, prox-
ied by the issuer’s population size, has a positive effect on borrowing costs. This may at
first be surprising given that larger subnational governments are generally more experi-
enced in the market compared to smaller issuers and are able to negotiate better rates with
underwriters. Local governments with larger population are usually big cities or counties
with more debt-issuing capacity, stronger economy but also lower debt capacity compared
to some of the smaller issuers. Further, there may be higher risk of these securities not
clearing the market if the investors are concerned about the debt capacity of larger issuers.
This reduced demand for debt issued by larger issuers may result in under-subscription and
push underwriters to increase interest offered to investors.
Previous studies have demonstrated that larger issues tend to incur lower borrowing
costs due to the economies of scale. The relationship is negative but statistically insignifi-
cant in my results. This is consistent with the theory that investors care about the issuer’s
creditworthiness rather than the issue size. Finally, prevailing market yields (daily BBI20
Index) have the expected positive effect. As market interest rates increase, borrowing costs
tend to rise.
15As a robustness check, the Appendix includes another specification with weighted maturity-level controls
in Table B.10. Results remain the same.
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3.6 CONCLUSION
This study shows that the secondary municipal bond market contains an additional layer
of credit quality information not captured by other lagged metrics such as credit ratings. A
favorable secondary market performance of the issuer’s existing debt has a negative effect
on future cost of borrowing for state and local governments. Better performance in the
secondary market is associated with better borrowing cost outcomes in the primary market
in the future period. Underwriters gauge market perception of the issuers debt and true
credit quality and the secondary market price and yield fluctuations provide a significant
signal in addition to credit ratings and issue/ issuer characteristics.
For a $40 million issue, three basis points reduction in borrowing costs means $12, 000
reduction in interest costs per year. For a frequent issuer that periodically issues large long-
term bonds, this reduction translates into significant savings over the life of each bond.
The effect of the secondary market on the primary market, therefore, should not be ig-
nored.These findings have several policy implications for debt-issuing subnational govern-
ments. Given that price and yield fluctuations of existing debt are significant real-time
predictors of future borrowing costs, state and local governments may be able to save on
borrowing costs by timing their debt issuance based on the market performance of their ex-
isting debt. Further, such knowledge may provide issuers with leverage when negotiating
with or requesting bids from underwriters or underwriting syndicates. Reducing borrowing
costs, in turn, is of significant value as it can free up resources for other public goods and
services.
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CHAPTER 4
DISPERSION IN TRADING ACTIVITY IN THE SECONDARY MUNICIPAL
BOND MARKET: PORTFOLIO ABSORPTION, PREEMPTIVE ACTION, OR
SPECULATIVE TRADING?
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ABSTRACT
The municipal bond market is full of peculiarities. One such puzzling fact is that some
securities trade thousands of times in the secondary market while most do not trade at all.
Studies have shown that these differences in trading frequency cannot simply be attributed
to transaction costs - actively traded bonds are not necessarily less expensive to trade. Un-
derstanding what accounts for such distinct patterns of trading activity can inform investors
and issuers about market demand and potentially improve government debt issuance out-
comes and household portfolio allocation decisions. This chapter examines the dispersion
of trading activity of municipal securities in the secondary market using large databases of
security- and transaction-level information. Results show that safer and high quality se-
curities tend to be taken off the market quickly and likely absorbed into the portfolios of
buy-and-hold type investors. Further, the call complexity hypothesis reveals distinct trad-
ing patterns for different trade types (interdealer trades vs. retail customer trades) as the
call date approaches. Finally, there is some evidence of speculative trading in the secondary
market which further contributes to the wide dispersion in trading activity among various
securities.
Keywords: municipal securities, municipal bonds, secondary market, trading activity,
trading frequency, bank-qualified bonds, speculative trading, portfolio absorption, bond
complexity, call option.
JEL Codes: G12, G14, H5, H70, H71.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
The municipal bond market is full of peculiarities. One such puzzling fact is that most
municipal bonds do not trade at all, while a small subset of munis display surprisingly high
levels of trading activity in the secondary muni market.1 This dispersion in the number
of trades cannot be attributed to transaction costs. Harris and Piwowar (2006) show that
actively traded bonds are not necessarily less costly to trade than infrequently traded bonds,
implying that differences in trading activity cannot be attributed to trading costs [29]. The
public finance literature does not provide any substantial explanation for why some munic-
ipal securities trade thousands of times in the secondary market while other do not trade at
all.
Understanding what drives these large variations in trading activity can benefit investors
as well as debt-issuing state and local governments. Issuers may be able to achieve lower
borrowing costs in the future if they understand how the market values their securities
(market perception), what clears the market, and what drives the demand. On the other
hand, investors can make better inferences about the liquidity of their investments. In
financial markets, investors place higher value on assets that are liquid and lack of trading
activity may signal liquidity issues. Consequently, issuers may benefit from knowing what
features make their debt more attractive to potential retail and institutional investors.
This paper examines the dispersion of trading activity for municipal securities in the
secondary market using large databases of issuance and transaction information. Different
hypotheses are tested to identify potential drivers of trading frequency by focusing on the
effect of varying security features on the secondary market trading activity. First, I test
the portfolio absorption hypothesis, that seasoned and attractive maturities display lower
trading activity, potentially due to the fact that they are quickly absorbed into the portfolios
of inactive retail and institutional investors. I also test the call complexity hypothesis,
1In this paper, terms “trade/trading frequency” and “trading activity” are used interchangeably and refer
to a number of trades in a given period (year).
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that a callable security is traded more (preemptively “dumped”) closer to its call date or
alternatively traded less merely due to the analytical burden of valuing its complex call
feature. Finally, I test the speculative trading hypothesis to explore whether securities with
high price and yield volatilities are traded more than their less volatile counterparts.
My results support the portfolio absorption and speculative trading hypotheses. Further,
the call complexity hypothesis reveals distinct trading patterns for different trade types as
the call date approaches. These findings are important for several reasons. First, Chapter 3
shows that the secondary market has a significant effect on future borrowing costs for state
and local governments. Thus, it is important to understand and explore all available infor-
mation the muni market provides, which can then be translated into more policy-relevant
metrics such as borrowing costs. Second, if the secondary market contains information
about investor perceptions and demand for specific securities, issuers and underwriters
may want to restructure future bond issuances to supply munis that the market demands
the most. Tapping into a larger investor pool, in turn, is likely to reduce interest costs
for subnational governments. Finally, if there are activities in the secondary market that
particularly harm retail investors or introduce unsubstantiated speculative trading, then the
regulators, such as the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), may want to be
aware of such activity.
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND LITERATURE
This study proposes and tests three hypotheses to understand the drivers of trading
activity in the secondary market for municipal securities:
• Portfolio Absorption Hypothesis: Seasoned and attractive securities trade less fre-
quently.
• Complexity Hypothesis: Callable securities trade more frequently closer to the call
date.
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• Speculative Trading Hypothesis: Securities with more volatile secondary market per-
formance trade more frequently.
The following sections discuss the logic behind each of the claims and relevant evidence
from corporate and municipal bond literature.
4.2.1 Portfolio Absorption
Lower Trading for Seasoned Securities
Part of the reason why most munis do not trade much in the secondary market could
be that they are simply not available for trading. The idea behind the portfolio absorption
hypothesis is that if investors buy and hold securities until maturity, then this will reduce
the overall trading activity in the secondary market since there are less munis available to
trade. Observing reduced trading activity over time, therefore, would be consistent with
such buy-and-hold behavior. Observing a negative relationship between the age of the
bond and its secondary market trading frequency would support the portfolio absorption
hypothesis. Corporate bond studies have found that trading frequency generally declines
as bonds age and find their way into portfolios of household investors and mutual funds
[30]. Given the perceived safety of the munis and the dominance of high net-worth retail
investors with long investment horizons in the market, the portfolio absorption hypothesis
seems rather plausible.
Investors are more likely to buy and hold a security to maturity if they believe the secu-
rity is safe and does not pose significant default risk. Ronen and Zhou (2013) find that once
corporate bonds are absorbed into portfolios, their liquidity declines rapidly, especially if
they are rated as investment-grade [31]. Bond research shows that newly issued securities
have much lower liquidity premiums than older bonds and trade much more frequently than
similar but “seasoned” bonds [32]. Securities are generally considered seasoned within the
first or second year of issuance [30]. However, Ronen and Zhou (2013) show that infre-
quent trades are not necessarily a sign of illiquidity or market inefficiency for corporate
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bonds - investors might simply be waiting for specific information and act on that informa-
tion in large trades in the future [31].
Lower Trading Activity for Bank-qualified Securities
Like other investors, most commercial banks purchase munis to benefit from the tax-
exemption interest income. Until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), banks were the
major holders of municipal bonds [28]. The passage of TRA86, now under section 265(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, altered the banks’ demand for municipal securi-
ties by essentially eliminating tax benefits for banks (with a few exceptions). The bank-
qualified designation allows banks to deduct a portion of the interest expense for the pur-
chase and holding of municipal obligations. Under TRA86, bonds can be classified as
bank-qualified (“qualified tax-exempt obligation”) if the debt is 1) issued by a qualified
small government issuing no more than $10 million of tax-exempt securities, 2) issued for
public purposes, and 3) and designated as qualified tax-exempt obligation.
Consequently, issues sold after August 6, 1986 have two designations: bank qualified
and non-bank qualified securities. The interest cost savings give commercial banks an in-
centive to absorb bank-qualified issues into their portfolios. Consequently, banks are will-
ing to accept lower returns on bank-qualified municipal bonds compared to other taxable
securities such as corporate bonds. As such, bank-qualified issues reduce interest costs for
small issuers and provide attractive tax benefits for commercial banks simultaneously. A
significantly lower trading activity for bank-qualified maturities could be a signal of mar-
ket demand for debt issued by smaller governments and potentially enable these issuers to
better negotiate and/or structure their interest costs.
Both municipal and corporate bond markets are dominated by large institutional in-
vestors, such as commercial banks and property and casualty insurance companies [28].
Harris and Piwowar (2006) argue that large institutional traders have a better sense of the
valuation of municipal bonds than uninformed retail investors [29]. Municipal bond trades
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are generally categorized as large institutional-size trades and smaller retail-size trades, al-
though the threshold between the two categories is somewhat arbitrary. The cutoff point
between institutional and retail trades ranges from $25, 000 to $100, 000 in most studies.
The report issued by Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) shows that $25, 000
is the median trade size in the municipal market [33]. Since it is not necessarily correct to
distinguish institutional and retail size trades simply based on trade size and we do not have
access to additional identifying information, this research focuses on whether a trade is re-
ported as a customer sale/purchase or an interdealer trade by the MSRB.2 The institutional
and retail distinction of the secondary market transactions if left for future research.
4.2.2 Call Complexity - Preemptive Action?
The municipal bond markets have a rich product diversity in terms of the types of debt
issued and various features attached to them. This creates a significant heterogeneity in the
secondary market. Security complexities, such as call features, may reduce the likelihood
of a trade due to the cost of information dissemination. Harris and Piwowar (2006) charac-
terize bond complexity by the following six features to explore their effect on transaction
costs: call feature,3 sinking fund provision,4 special redemption/extraordinary call features,
nonstandard interest payment frequency,5 nonstandard interest accrual basis bonds and fi-
nancial guarantees such as insurance, letter of credit, etc. [29]. Other studies have explored
the effect of credit ratings, insurance, and debt types on market yields, but the effects of the
approaching call date on trading activity have not been explored.
Securities with complex features, such as extraordinary call options, can be difficult
2 The MSRB reports secondary transactions as customer trades (purchases from customers or sales to
customers) or interdealer trades. Customers in this context are non-institutional investors. Therefore, retail-
size trades and interdealer trades are not mutually exclusive. A dealer may be involved in both a retail-size
trade and an institutional-size trade. Similarly, a customer sale (sale to a customer) or customer purchase
(purchase from a customer) may be of institutional size but that is less likely.
3The call feature allows the issuer to call (pay back) the bonds before the maturity date.
4Sinking fund provision in many bond indentures stipulates that the borrower retire a certain proportion
of the debt annually.
5Standard interest payment frequency is semiannual.
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to evaluate, especially for unsophisticated retail investors. A call option gives the issuer
the ability to call the debt and reissue at a lower rate if the market conditions change.
Therefore, the call feature protects the issuer from undesirable changes in interest rates. It
is plausible that buy-and-hold investors will be less inclined to hold on to these securities
if they expect the issuer will exercise the call option. This implies that callable securities
can potentially have different trading patterns and trading frequencies, especially closer to
the call date compared to non-callable securities. The other complexity features described
in this section are fixed at the issuance and do not vary over time and therefore not used in
this longitudinal analysis.
4.2.3 Speculative Trading
Traditional finance literature defines speculation as trading high risk securities with the
motive of taking advantage of market fluctuations. Speculative trading is more prevalent
in financial markets if price movements are highly volatile and relatively frequent.6 Price
volatilities are lower for bonds with higher yields7 and yield volatility is generally consid-
ered to be an indicator of risk arising from movements in interest rates. High volatility of
bond yields, therefore, implies less predictability in the yields.8 A simple and straightfor-
ward measure of historical or realized volatility is the standard deviation of yield changes
from the previous, most recent trade. This is an ex-post measure of volatility.
The stock market displays enough trading activity to analyze the change in yields/prices
from the previous trades and easily estimate the volatility of prices/yields on a daily/weekly
basis. Unfortunately, such equity market strategy for estimating volatilities is not feasible
for municipal securities since a significant portion of munis do not trade at all. Further, even
if there is a previous trade, it may be a different type of a trade (e.g. customer purchase
verses interdealer trade) which makes analyzing the change less systematic. Therefore,
6Factors that affect a bond’s price volatility are coupon rate, time to maturity, and trading yield.
7The price of a bond is an inverse function of the required bond yield.
8A yield volatility near zero would indicate that overall yields are clustered around the average and are
relatively stable.
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price and yield volatility effects have to be evaluated separately for different types of trades
(customer sales vs. customer purchases vs. interdealer trades).
Downing and Zhang (2004) argue that price range, scaled by the inverse of average
prices, is a better proxy for price volatility than changes from the previous day’s closing
price since it captures more of the variation and is less noisy [34]. However, the authors
do not distinguish between trade types when estimating volatilities. This is important in a
market where inefficiencies may arise depending on whether the trade is a customer trade
and an interdealer transaction. Downing and Zhang (2004) estimate the effect of trading
frequency on price volatility, but the direction of the relationship is not justified [34]. If
there is speculative trading in the market, it may be that price and yield volatilities affect
trading frequency rather than vice versa. I discuss and analyze this further in Section 4.4.2
and Section 4.5. Since most munis are considered safe, with high credit ratings and bond
insurance, speculative trading on a small subset of the outstanding issues with above aver-
age price and yield fluctuations may partially explain low trading activity for the majority
of outstanding securities.
4.3 DATA
This study uses large issuance (primary municipal bond market), transaction (secondary
municipal bond market), and market (bond market indexes) data sets, currently not avail-
able to the public. The data come from the Municipal Securities Laboratory at the Andrew
Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. The analysis is conducted at
the CUSIP level (maturity level), rather than the issuance level. CUSIPs are unique secu-
rity identifiers issued by the Committees on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures
(CUSIP) Bureau. Municipal bonds, with the exception of term bonds, are issued in multiple
increments at different prices with different amounts, maturity dates, discounts/premiums,
and CUSIP numbers.9 CUSIP-level analysis, therefore, is more granular than issuance- or
9For example, a municipality may issue a $1 million bond comprised of 10 CUSIPs, with the first maturity
in the amount of $100, 000 maturing in one year, $100, 000 maturing in two years, and so forth.
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bond-level analysis.
Daily historical transaction data for the secondary market from 2005 through 2015 is
obtained from the MSRB. Each observation of the MSRB data contains the CUSIP number,
the transaction date and time, trade price, coupon rate, yield to maturity, trade amount, and
whether the trade was sale to a customer (investor) by a dealer, purchase from a customer
by a dealer, or an interdealer trade. The data on issuance information is obtained from
the Mergent’s Municipal Bond Securities Database (MBSD). This database contains the
CUSIP numbers and a variety of security- and issuance-level information such as issue and
maturity dates, debt type, coupon type, type of capital purpose and use of proceeds, credit
rating and other enhancements, default information, call dates, etc.
4.3.1 Exclusion Criteria
First, I analyze only bonds. Bonds have different risk and reward properties than deriva-
tives and other securities. Second, issues with variable coupon rates are removed. More
specifically, these are adjustable, deferred, floating auction, floating, floating at floor, in-
verse floater, index-linked, stripped, stripped convertible, stripped principal, stepped, or
variable rate coupons. Analyzing variable rate issues and the impact of rate changes on
trading activity are beyond the scope of this paper. Third, the sample is restricted to the 50
states and their subsidiary governments. All securities issued by American Samo, Canal
Zone, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, District of Columbia,
the United States government agencies, as well as any issues with missing state information
are removed. Fourth, securities that are taxable federally and/or at the state level are ex-
cluded from the sample to guarantee that the results are not driven by complex tax features.
Fifth, the sample is restricted to issues with new or refunding capital purpose.10 I
exclude securities that have a lifespan of one year or less to avoid the confounding effects
of demand for short-term securities. I also exclude securities with make-whole features, of
10I exclude observations with capital purpose listed as remarketing/convertible, cross-over refunding, sale
canceled, restructured debt, or municipal forward. These observations are a very small subset of the data set.
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which there are only a handful in the sample. Only general obligation bonds are analyzed
in the final sample.11 I only keep investment-grade securities and drop unrated or below-
investment grade maturities. As a robustness check, results are also presented for unrated
securities in the Appendix in Table C.3. The original issue premium bonds are the most
prevalent securities, so I drop all other coupon types. Finally, I drop uninsured bonds and
securities with sinking fund provisions.
4.4 METHODOLOGY
4.4.1 Circumventing Truncated Data Issue
The few studies that analyze trading activity have examined only securities that have
traded at least once, ignoring other outstanding securities which did not trade.12 Given that
most securities trade very infrequently, such strategy discards too much information. An-
alyzing only traded securities biases the results when predicting trading frequency for all
outstanding securities. In this study, primary market data is transformed to security-years
for all years that a security was active to construct a sample of all outstanding securities in
a given year. For example, instead of one observation for a security with CUSIP (See Sec-
tion 4.3 for CUSIP definition) identifier 356231KH7, which was outstanding for four years
between 2005 and 2008 and only traded 45 times in 2006, four security-year observations
are created to account for trading activity in year 2006 and lack of trading activity in the
remaining years. Table 4.1 provides a visual example of this. Identifying all outstanding
issues in this way allows to circumvent truncated transaction data issue and allows us to
analyze all outstanding securities rather than the ones that traded.
11Security types listed as revenue, fuel/vehicle tax, lease/rent, other, public improvement, sales/excise tax,
special assessment, tax allocation, US government, sales agreement, loan agreement, tobacco agreement,
tuition agreement, special tax, mortgage loans, education loans, certificate of participation are removed.
12See Dougal et al. (2016) [35] for municipal bonds and see Alexander et al. (2000) [30] for corporate
bonds.
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Table 4.1: Data Transformation
Original Data Transformed Data
CUSIP Issue
Yr
Maturity
Yr
CUSIP Issue
Yr
Maturity
Yr
Trade
Yr
# of
Trades
656451ZT2 1995 1998 656451ZT2 1995 1998 1995 0
356231KH7 2005 2008 656451ZT2 1995 1998 1996 10
656451ZT2 1995 1998 1997 0
656451ZT2 1995 1998 1998 0
356231KH7 2005 2008 2005 0
356231KH7 2005 2008 2006 45
356231KH7 2005 2008 2007 0
356231KH7 2005 2008 2008 0
4.4.2 Measurements
Table 4.2 provides an overview of variables used in the analysis. The measures of trade
frequency (by trade type) used as the dependent variables in this study are listed in the first
part of the table. The next subsection elaborates on measures that were constructed for this
study, namely the price and yield volatility variables.
Price and yield volatility
Section 4.2.3 describes the logic behind using volatility measures as a signal of specu-
lative trading. In this study, price/yield volatilities of each CUSIP are first measured as the
standard deviation of prices/yields of the previous ten trades for that CUSIP. This threshold
is chosen because the default number of past trades shown on MSRB’s Electronic Munici-
pal Market Access (EMMA) website by CUSIP is ten adn there is no theoretical reason to
choose another threshold. Further, it is plausible that market participants give more weight
to recent yield and price changes than all historical performance. Therefore, a shorter time
horizon is more likely to capture market reactions to price and yield fluctuations. Such
backward-looking (rolling) measure of volatility captures the trade performance informa-
tion that would have been available to the investor at the time of the trade. After creating
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Table 4.2: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources
Variable Name Description and Measurement Source
All trades Number of trades per year MSRB
Customer purchases Number of customer purchases per year MSRB
Customer sales Number of customer sales per year MSRB
Interdealer trades Number of interdealer trades per year MSRB
Age Average annual number of years since issuance MBSD
Bank Qualified Identifier for bank-qualification13 MBSD
Time to Maturity Average annual number of years left until maturity MBSD
Time to Call Average annual number of years left to call MBSD
Price Volatility Std of the previous 10 trade prices. See Sec-
tion 4.4.2
MSRB
Yield Volatility Std of the previous 10 trade yields. See Sec-
tion 4.4.2
MSRB
Unemployment rate Annual state unemployment rate, seasonally ad-
justed
BLS
BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics
MBSD = Mergent’s Municipal Bond Securities Database
MMA = Municipal Market Analytics
MSRB = Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Historical Trade Data
past yield/price volatility for each trade, the volatility measures are averaged to annual level
for each CUSIP so that the unit of observation is CUSIP-years.
I assume zero volatility in the absence of any previous trades. Without this assumption,
the final sample will have only securities that had a trade. This would defeat the goal of this
study to analyze all outstanding securities. Again, the purpose of this study is to understand
secondary market trading activity for all securities, not just the ones that traded.
4.4.3 Model
Given that most municipal securities do not trade at all, while others trade frequently, a
model that takes lower bound censoring into account is methodologically necessary. When
13Binary variable equal to 1 if the security is bank-qualified.
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the dependent variable has a significant pile-up at zero, Tobit-type models that take the de-
pendent variable’s skewed distribution into account can better address the selection bias.14
This study uses the random-effects Tobit design to model the trade frequency:
Trade Frequencyit = max(αi +X
′
itβ + it, 0) (4.1)
it|xi, αi ∼ Normal(0, σ2 ) (4.2)
where αi is the unobserved effect and X is a vector of explanatory variables including
an intercept. Note that the assumption of random-effects rather than fixed-effects is con-
straining. There is likely a correlation between observables and the unobserved effect, αi.
However, fixed-effects Tobit (or probit) is computationally unfeasible and random-effects
Tobit is the next best alternative. One advantage of a panel model is that it controls for char-
acteristics that do not vary over time and thereby eliminates the need to include maturity
and issue-specific variables in the regression and increases the degrees of freedom.
4.5 FINDINGS
First, the sample is separated into callable and non-callable bonds. Callable securities
are likely to have different trading patterns, especially closer to the call date. Further, yield
to call is likely to be different from yield to maturity. The sample is separated into callable
and non-callable subsets rather than just adding a call option indicator in the models be-
cause of the fundamental underlying differences in callable and non-callable securities.
For callable securities, the analysis is based on the time period until call rather than time
remaining until maturity. Summary statistics for non-callable and callable subsamples is
given in the Appendix in Table C.1 and Table C.2, respectively.
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the breakdown of the dependent variables for callable
14Zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) is used as a robustness check and is available upon re-
quest. Results remain essentially the same. ZINB does not account for the panel nature of the data. However,
the model assumes that two different data generating processes account for zero and non-zero outcomes.
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and non-callable samples. As expected, there is a significant pile-up at zero in trading
frequency for all trade types. Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are in
the Appendix in Table C.1 and Table C.2. Results in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 are shown for
all trades, interdealer trades, purchases from customers, and sales to customers separately.
Conducting the analysis by trade type allows a more granular look at the behavior of market
participants, in this case broker-dealers and retail and institutional investors.
Results for non-callable securities are given in Table 4.5. Overall, as securities age,
trading activity increases. About every two years, there is a new trade. The negative coef-
ficient on the interaction of the age variable and the bank-qualification identifier indicates
that trading activity declines with age for bank-qualified securities compared to non-bank-
qualified securities. This is consistent with the fact that commercial banks have an incen-
tive to buy and hold bank-qualified securities until maturity, thereby reducing the number
of such securities available for trade. Consistent with portfolio absorption hypothesis, there
is a positive relationship between time remaining until maturity and trading frequency. As
time remaining until maturity declines, trading activity declines or said differently, there
is less trading activity toward the end of the life of the security. This is consistent with
the previous finding that newer securities with longer maturity horizons tend to trade more
frequently. These results provide support for the portfolio absorption hypothesis.
Results in Table 4.5 show that recent trade price and trade yield fluctuations have a sig-
nificant effect on trade frequencies. A one percentage point increase in the yield volatility
measure implies about one more trades for that security overall. If higher volatility is driven
by lack of trading activity, then we would be more likely to find a negative rather than a
positive relationship. In this scenario, increased trading would likely lead to convergence
to the mean and reduce volatility. However, we find a positive relationship between the
volatility and trading activity, further supporting the hypothesized direction of the relation-
ship. The effect of price fluctuations is also significant. A one percentage point increase in
the recent trade price volatility implies about 4 more trades. Regional economic conditions,
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Table 4.3: Trading Frequency: Non-callable Securities
Frequency Percent
All Trades
0 83,661 65.53
1-10 29,444 23.06
10+ 14,557 11.4
Interdealer Trades
0 93,816 73.49
1-10 28,941 22.67
10+ 4,905 3.84
Customer Purchases
0 89,845 70.38
1-10 36,275 28.41
10+ 1,542 1.21
Customer Sales
0 84,315 66.05
1-10 39,214 30.72
10+ 4,133 3.24
Table 4.4: Trading Frequency: Callable Securities
Frequency Percent
All Trades
0 229,742 67.06
1-10 67,819 19.8
10+ 45,012 13.14
Interdealer Trades
0 257,924 75.29
1-10 69,862 20.39
10+ 14,787 4.32
Customer Purchases
0 239,626 69.95
1-10 97,061 28.33
10+ 5,886 1.72
Customer Sales
0 231,364 67.54
1-10 93,542 27.31
10+ 17,667 5.16
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Table 4.5: Non-Callable Securities: Random-Effects Tobit,
DV= # of Trades per Year per CUSIP
All Trades Interdealer Purchases
from
Customers
Sales to
Customers
Age 0.44*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Time to Maturity 0.36*** 0.20*** 0.06*** 0.18***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Age * Bank-qualified -0.39*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Yield Volatility 1.03*** 2.68*** 0.59*** -0.15
(0.15) (0.15) (0.01) (0.11)
Price Volatility 3.63*** 1.78*** 0.43*** 1.08***
(0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Unemployment Rate 0.31*** 0.17*** 0.06*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Obs (CUSIP-years) 127,662 127,662 127,662 127,662
# of securities 26,529 26,529 26,529 26,529
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
proxied by the state unemployment rates, have a small positive effect on trading activity.
This may be due to the fact that traders care more about issuer’s financial conditions and
yield and price characteristics than their current economic environment. Finally, the trend
(year fixed effects) for the trading activity (not shown due to space constraints) indicates
that trade frequencies declined during the recent Great Recession and have been increasing
since.
Analyzing trade frequencies by various trade types reveals interesting patterns. The
effect of the price and yield volatility measures are larger for interdealer trades than other
trade types. Given that dealers are one of the most sophisticated market participants who are
able to effectively weigh all of the market characteristics, this is not completely surprising.
A dealer may be better able to take advantage of price and yield fluctuations through new
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Table 4.6: Callable Securities: Random-Effects Tobit, DV=
# of Trades per Year per CUSIP
All Trades Interdealer Purchases
from
Customers
Sales to
Customers
Age 0.27*** 0.06*** 0.20*** 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time to Call 0.26*** 0.22*** -0.01 0.22***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Time to Call * Bank-
qualified
-0.69*** -0.31*** -0.04*** -0.47***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Yield Volatility -0.36*** 0.64*** 0.07* 0.13
(0.12) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09)
Price Volatility 0.45*** 1.27*** 0.17*** 0.13***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Unemployment Rate 0.52*** 0.28*** 0.11*** 0.27***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Obs (CUSIP-years) 187,241 187,241 187,241 187,241
N of securities 34,699 34,699 34,699 34,699
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
trades than a retail investor.
Table 4.6 provides the same results as in Table 4.5 but for callable maturities. Aging
has a small positive effect on trading activity. Again, for non-bank-qualified securities,
trading frequency declines with age. A five-year change in age implies three more trades
for non-bank-qualified securities but only two more trades for bank-qualified securities.
Interestingly, as the call date approaches, trading activity decreases (as time to call in-
creases, trading increases). The number of purchases from customers has an insignificant
but negative relationship with time remaining until call. Furthermore, sales to customers
and interdealer trades respond equally to the approaching call time. This may be a sign that
dealers are transferring the call risk to retail investors and other customers.
Price volatility measure has the expected positive effect on trading activity. The effect
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of the price volatility is larger for interdealer trades than customer transactions. Again,
given that dealers are one of the most sophisticated market participants who are able to ef-
fectively weigh all of the market characteristics, this is not completely surprising. Dealers
may be better able to take advantage of price and yield fluctuations through new trades. The
effect of the yield volatility is not consistent across different trade types. Yield volatility has
a positive effect on interdealer trades, again most likely due to dealer sophistication. How-
ever, yield volatility and trading have a significant positive relationship only for interdealer
trades. Exploring why this is the case is left for future research. The state unemployment
rate has a significant and positive effect on trading activity. These results provide some
evidence for portfolio absorption, speculative trading, and call complexity hypotheses. The
negative effect of bank qualification on trading activity is consistent across all trades both
for callable and non-callable security samples.
4.6 CONCLUSION
This study uses large databases of municipal market issuance and transaction data not
availably to the public to explore the drivers of the secondary market trading activity by
testing three hypotheses. Findings indicate that as bank-qualified munis age, trading ac-
tivity declines, since banks have an incentive to buy and hold these securities. The call
complexity hypothesis reveals interesting findings as trading activity declines closer to call
date. However, interdealer sales and sales to customers increase closer to call date while
purchases from customers remain stable. This may be a signal that dealers transfer the call
risk to customers by selling off their inventories as the call date approaches. Finally, as
past price and yield volatilities increase, trade frequencies tend to increase which may be
an indication that traders are trying to take advantage of price and yield fluctuations and
any potential arbitrage opportunities.
Policy implications of these findings are multi-faceted. Quick absorption of desir-
able munis into inactive investor portfolios implies that there may be more demand for
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investment-grade munis than what the market currently supplies. This is especially rele-
vant for governments who are able to issue smaller, bank-qualified issues. Issuers may be
able to negotiate better borrowing costs if they are aware of market demand and investor
preferences. Further, regulators should be aware of market trading behavior and investigate
further whether traders are transferring the call risk to retail investors.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
87
5.1 CONCLUSION
In a decentralized government like the United States, the responsibility to make capi-
tal investments in public projects falls mostly on the shoulders of state and local govern-
ments. From a policy perspective, it is important to understand whether state and local
governments are getting the full benefits of the federal subsidy through tax-exemption of
municipal bonds. Following a brief introduction to the municipal bond market in Chapter
1, Chapter 2 estimates the tax benefits of municipal bonds. The use of the entire bond
universe data results in a paired taxable and tax-exempt subsample which provides the
necessary precision to account for differences in the underlying idiosyncratic risk and in-
vestor preferences. Results of the Random Coefficients Model (RCM) show that implied
marginal tax rates are 32− 34% for general purpose governments, which is consistent with
theory. The muni puzzle, the previous finding that interest rates on tax-exempt bonds are
too high, disappears under more careful scrutiny. This implies that if the tax-exemption
policy is eliminated or even capped, interest costs for municipal governments will increase
substantially.
Chapter 3 shows that there is a significant relationship between primary and secondary
municipal bond markets. This chapter shows that the secondary municipal bond market
contains an additional layer of credit quality information not captured by other lagged met-
rics such as credit ratings by “The Big Three.” A favorable secondary market performance
of the issuer’s existing debt decreases future cost of borrowing for state and local govern-
ments. Results imply that the secondary market price and yield fluctuations may provide a
supplemental avenue for gaging the market demand and investor perception of the issuer’s
creditworthiness in addition to credit ratings. For an issue of $40 million, three basis points
reduction in borrowing costs means a $12, 000 reduction in interest costs per year. For
a frequent issuer which periodically issues long-term bonds, this reduction translates into
large savings over the life of each bond. The effect of the secondary market on the primary
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market, therefore, should not be ignored.
Chapter 4 uses large databases of municipal market issuance and transaction data not
availably to the public to explore the drivers of the secondary market trading activity by
testing three hypotheses. Findings indicate that as bank-qualified munis age, trading ac-
tivity declines, since banks have an incentive to buy and hold these securities. The call
complexity hypothesis reveals interesting findings as trading activity declines closer to call
date. However, interdealer sales and sales to customers increase closer to call date while
purchases from customers remain stable. This may be a signal that dealers transfer the call
risk to customers by selling off their inventories as the call date approaches. Finally, as past
price and yield volatilities increase, trade frequencies tend to increase which may be an
indication that traders are trying to take advantage of price and yield fluctuations and any
potential arbitrage opportunities. Policy implications of these findings are multi-faceted.
Quick absorption of desirable munis into inactive investor portfolios implies that there may
be more demand for investment-grade munis than what the market currently supplies. This
is especially relevant for governments who are able to issue smaller, bank-qualified issues.
Issuers may be able to negotiate better borrowing costs if they are aware of market demand
and investor preferences. Further, regulators should be aware of market trading behavior
and investigate further whether traders are transferring the call risk to retail investors.
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A.1 Matched Sample Descriptives
Table A.1 provides summary statistics for the final matched sample based on the match-
ing criteria described in Section 2.3.1. The average offering yield for taxable municipal se-
curities is 59 basis points higher than the average yield on exempt securities. If we were to
apply Equation 2.1 to these mean statistics, this would imply an average implied marginal
tax rate of 18% which is much lower than the tax bracket for a typical muni investor. How-
ever, a better descriptive statistic is the implied marginal tax rate based on the matched
pairs, τ , from Equation 2.1. The matched pairs imply a marginal tax benefit of 20%, on
average. However, the range for τ is quite wide and includes negative values! Further, the
larger portion of the final matched sample is comprised of special districts. The negative
values imply that for these pairs, the offering yields on tax-exempt securities are higher
than their taxable counterparts. At its worst, the tax benefit should be zero if coupon rates
are the same.
Table A.1: Matched Sample Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Min Max
Offering Yield (Exempt) 6,472 2.72 1.31 0.10 8.75
Offering Yield (Tax) 6,472 3.31 1.46 0.15 10.00
τ 6,472 0.20 0.13 -0.44 0.79
Market Yield 6,472 2.40 1.27 0.14 5.33
Coupon (Exempt) 6,472 3.63 1.25 0.00 8.75
Coupon (Tax) 6,472 3.94 1.36 0.00 10.00
Offering Price (Exempt) 6,472 104.31 8.36 6.61 131.72
Offering Price (Tax) 6,472 102.85 7.09 4.51 127.31
Issue Size (Exempt, millions) 6,472 67.00 129.00 0.00 1,190.00
Issue Size (Tax, millions) 6,472 62.20 109.00 0.06 826.00
Maturity Size (Exempt, millions) 6,466 3.16 8.10 0.01 181.00
Maturity Size (Tax, millions) 6,469 3.57 11.70 0.01 300.00
Credit Rating 6,472 8.94 9.45 0.00 21.00
General Obligation Bond 6,472 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Call Option 6,472 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Bank Qualified 6,472 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Insured 6,472 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Sinking fund 6,472 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Time to Maturity 6,472 7.79 5.92 1.00 40.00
Rated 6,472 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
New (vs. Refunding) 6,472 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Table A.2: Matched Sample Tabulations
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Premium Bond 3,318 51.27 51.27
Par Bond 2,394 36.99 88.26
Discount Bond 739 11.42 99.68
Zero Coupon Bond 21 0.32 100.00
Negotiated 2,954 45.64 45.64
Competitive 2,428 37.52 83.16
NA 1,090 16.84 100.00
Semiannual 6,391 98.75 98.75
At Maturity 81 1.25 100.00
Total 6,472
Table A.3: Matched Sample Distribution of Issuer Types
Special Districts 4,908 75.83 75.83
Cities 701 10.83 86.67
States 331 5.11 91.78
School Districts 224 3.46 95.24
Counties 206 3.18 98.42
Towns/Townships 102 1.58 100.00
Total 6,472 100
93
Table A.4: Matched Sample Distribution of Use of Proceeds
Frequency Percent Cumulative
General Purpose 1,618 25.00 25.00
Airports 1,205 18.62 43.62
Single Family Housing 971 15.00 58.62
Multi-Family Housing 651 10.06 68.68
Other Housing 376 5.81 74.49
Water and Sewer 211 3.26 77.75
Primary/Secondary Education 209 3.23 80.98
Higher Education 200 3.09 84.07
Seaports 195 3.01 87.08
Public Power 138 2.13 89.22
Redevelopment 130 2.01 91.22
Single/Multi-Family Housing 129 1.99 93.22
Economic Development 78 1.21 94.42
Solid Waste 58 0.90 95.32
Other Transportation 52 0.80 96.12
Hospital 36 0.56 96.68
Government/ Public Buildings 29 0.45 97.13
Veterans 23 0.36 97.48
Parking Facilities 21 0.32 97.81
Airlines 18 0.28 98.08
Pollution Control 18 0.28 98.36
Other Utilities 16 0.25 98.61
Industrial Development 13 0.20 98.81
Multiple Public Utilities 12 0.19 99.00
Fire Station/Equipment 12 0.19 99.18
Other1 53 0.83 100.00
Total 6,472 100 100
1The following categories are condensed into other category due to space limitations: Toll roads, Other
Healthcare, Other Recreation, Student Loans, Nursing Homes, Parks/Zoos/Beaches, Retirement centers, Sta-
diums/Sports Complex, Convention Centers, Gas, Library/Museums, Mass Transit, Other Education.
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A.2 Full Unmatched Sample Statistics and Checks
One concern with employing such a strict matching technique as the one used in Chap-
ter 2 may be that the final matched sample is not representative of the full muni universe.
Table A.5 provides the summary statistics for the full sample, of which only 5% are taxable.
I arrive at this full sample after applying the exclusions used in Section 2.4.2. Table A.6
provides the same statistics for the full taxable sample, and Table A.7 provides the same
statistics for the full exempt sample. Table A.8 shows the RCM results for the full sample
with all yields (taxable and tax-exempt) as the dependent variable and the taxable dummy
as the key covariate.
First, the problem with full sample analysis compared to a matching technique used
in this study is that identifying the proper sample weights is not easy. About 95% of the
sample is comprised of tax-exempt securities. There are tens of thousands of different is-
suers and significant heterogeneity in the security characteristics which a taxable dummy
cannot completely account for. Second, this setup does not allow us to test the relative
yield relationship expressed in Equation ch1eq1 easily. Further, simply including dummy
variables in Table A.8 may not fully address the effect of security characteristics on rela-
tive yields. Finally, the matched sample has no bank-qualified securities whereas 41% of
the unmatched exempt sample is comprised of bank-qualified securities. However, this is
mostly driven by the fact that taxable munis are generally not bank-qualified, only 0.3% of
the unmatched taxable sample bank-qualified.
Table A.5: Unmatched Sample Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Min Max
Offering Yield 1,481,961 3.27 1.23 0.03 14.72
Taxable 1,481,961 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Market Yield 1,481,961 2.95 1.23 0.29 5.99
Coupon Rate 1,481,961 3.86 1.09 0.00 15.00
Offering Price 1,481,961 103.28 5.70 1.25 202.70
Issue size (millions) 1,481,961 47.20 150.38 0.01 12,850.00
Maturity size (millions) 1,472,342 2.51 16.88 0.00 12,850.00
Credit Rating 1,481,961 10.17 9.35 0.00 21.00
General Obligation 1,481,961 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00
Call Option 1,481,961 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Bank Qualified 1,481,961 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Insured 1,481,961 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Sinking Fund 1,481,961 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
Time to maturity 1,481,961 10.22 6.17 2.00 45.00
Rated 1,481,961 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
New (vs. Refunding) 1,481,961 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Table A.6: Unmatched Taxable Sample Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Min Max
Offering Yield 70,064 3.91 1.47 0.29 14.72
Market Yield 70,064 2.86 1.30 0.29 5.99
Coupon Rate 70,064 4.10 1.42 0.00 14.00
Offering Price 70,064 100.97 3.16 13.72 151.82
Issue size (millions) 70,064 41.56 82.88 0.01 2,260.38
Maturity size (millions) 69,613 3.68 14.08 0.01 1,000.00
Credit Rating 70,064 9.63 9.39 0.00 21.00
General Obligation 70,064 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Call Option 70,064 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Bank Qualified 70,064 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Insured 70,064 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Sinking Fund 70,064 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Time to maturity 70,064 9.84 7.50 2.00 45.00
Rated 70,064 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
New (vs. Refunding) 70,064 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
Table A.7: Unmatched Exempt Sample Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Min Max
Offering Yield 1,411,897 3.24 1.21 0.03 14.00
Market Yield 1,411,897 2.96 1.22 0.29 5.99
Coupon Rate 1,411,897 3.85 1.07 0.00 15.00
Offering Price 1,411,897 103.39 5.77 1.25 202.70
Issue size (millions) 1,411,897 47.48 152.95 0.01 12,850.00
Maturity size (millions) 1,402,729 2.46 17.00 0.00 12,850.00
Credit Rating 1,411,897 10.20 9.35 0.00 21.00
General Obligation 1,411,897 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Call Option 1,411,897 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Bank Qualified 1,411,897 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Insured 1,411,897 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Sinking Fund 1,411,897 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Time to maturity 1,411,897 10.24 6.10 2.00 45.00
Rated 1,411,897 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
New (vs. Refunding) 1,411,897 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Table A.8: Unmatched Sample RCM, DV = Yield
Taxable 1.007 *** 1.003 *** 0.155 *** 0.160 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
Issuance-level (std) 0.661 0.516 0.013 0.014
( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 )
Issuer-level (std) 0.198 0.043 0.042
0.006 0.001 ( 0.001 )
Offering Price -0.000 *** -0.000 -0.002 *** -0.003 ***
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Coupon Rate 0.310 *** 0.303 *** 0.173 *** 0.176 ***
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Issue Size 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.065 *** 0.069 ***
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
County 0.014 ***
( 0.001 )
State -0.160 ***
( 0.002 )
School District 0.011 ***
( 0.001 )
Special District 0.023 ***
( 0.001 )
Town/Township 0.040 ***
( 0.001 )
Call Option 0.133 *** 0.131 ***
0.001 ( 0.001 )
Sinking Fund 0.054 *** 0.055 ***
0.001 ( 0.001 )
Credit Rating -0.004 *** -0.004 ***
0.000 ( 0.000 )
General Obligation 0.021 *** 0.037 ***
0.001 ( 0.001 )
Insured 0.012 *** 0.004 ***
0.001 ( 0.001 )
New (vs. Refunding) 0.078 *** 0.080 ***
0.001 ( 0.001 )
Market Spread (MMA) 0.866 *** 0.859 ***
0.001 ( 0.001 )
Bank Qualified 0.200 *** 0.197 ***
0.001 ( 0.001 )
Maturity/Year Effects YES YES YES YES
Obs (CUSIPs) 1,481,961 1,481,961 1,481,961 1,481,961
Issuances 106,169 106,169 106,169 106,169
Issuers 32,595 32,595 32,595 32,595
97
APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 3 APPENDICES
98
B.1 Maturity-level Descriptives and Checks
Table B.1 and Table B.2 show the summary statistics for the competitive and negotiated
samples for the variables used in the maturity level analysis. The sample is separated into
competitive and negotiated sales to avoid the selection bias concerns regarding the method
of sale. Average offering yields are higher but less variable for the negotiated sample
than for the competitive sample. However, offering prices are lower and more variable
for the negotiated sample than the competitive sample. This may be partially due to the
fact that average credit ratings are higher for competitive issues than for negotiated issues.
Negotiated issuances also tend to be much larger. The two samples look relatively similar
in remaining categories. Table B.6 and Table B.5 show the most frequent issuers for each
subsample. New York City is the most frequent issuer for both sale types.
Table B.7 shows the effect of secondary market price fluctuations on the future offer-
ing prices. Market prices have a positive effect on offering prices and this effect varies
largely by issuers and bond issuances. A one percentage point fluctuation in trade prices
of comparable outstanding securities increase future prices by 9 basis point for competitive
sales and by 11 basis points for negotiated sales. However, the difference is not statistically
significant (p = 0.18).
Table B.1: Negotiated Sample Statistics, N= 43, 304
Variable Mean Std Min Max
Offering Yield 3.07 1.26 0.08 8.00
Offering Price 103.55 13.02 5.34 176.67
Trade Yield Spreadt−1 -0.89 1.49 -93.38 58.72
Trade Price Spreadt−1 2.96 8.57 -47.94 85.62
Credit Rating 10.95 9.45 0.00 21.00
Call option 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Bank Qualification 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Maturity Par (in million) 4.96 17.00 0.00 1,200.00
Offering Par (in million) 124.00 307.00 0.04 6,540.00
Market yield (MMA) 2.90 1.21 0.25 5.99
Time to Maturity 9.21 5.74 1.00 39.00
Sale year 2009 3.25 2005 2015
Rated 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Coupon Rate 3.85 1.28 0.00 12.00
Insured 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
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Table B.2: Competitive Sample Statistics, N= 61, 828
Variable Mean Std Min Max
Offering Yield 2.54 1.25 0.05 7.89
Offering Price 105.67 8.43 6.68 149.52
Trade Yield Spreadt−1 -0.97 1.36 -58.37 56.66
Trade Price Spreadt−1 2.00 6.79 -33.65 87.06
Credit Rating 11.51 9.63 0.00 21.00
Call option 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Bank Qualification 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Maturity Par (in million) 4.29 9.31 0.00 304.00
Offering Par (in million) 84.50 155.00 0.07 1,260.00
Market yield (MMA) 2.52 1.24 0.25 5.71
Time to Maturity 8.41 5.46 1.00 37.00
Sale year 2010 3.18 2005 2015
Rated 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Coupon Rate 3.72 1.14 0.00 9.00
Insured 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00
Table B.3: Negotiated Sample Distribution of Issuer Types
School Districts 18,511 42.75 42.75
Cities 9,293 21.46 64.21
States 6,068 14.01 78.21
Counties 4,075 9.41 87.63
Special Districts 3,916 9.04 96.67
Towns/Townships 1,441 3.33 100.00
Total 43,304
Table B.4: Competitive Sample Distribution of Issuer Types
School Districts 17,411 28.16 28.16
Cities 16,044 25.95 54.11
Counties 11,643 18.83 72.94
States 9,069 14.67 87.61
Towns/Townships 4,207 6.80 94.41
Special Districts 3,454 5.59 100.00
Total 61,828
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Table B.5: Negotiated Sample Frequent Issuers
Issuer Name Frequency Percent Cum
NEW YORK N Y 1,548 3.3 3.3
OREGON ST 1,062 2.26 5.56
CALIFORNIA ST 1,049 2.24 7.8
TEXAS ST 821 1.75 9.55
LOS ANGELES CALIF UNI SCH DIST 587 1.25 10.8
CHICAGO ILL 553 1.18 11.98
CONNECTICUT ST 395 0.84 12.82
OHIO ST 390 0.83 13.66
HONOLULU HAWAII CITY & CNTY 378 0.81 14.46
COLUMBUS OHIO 324 0.69 15.15
ALASKA MUN BD BK ALASKA MUN BD BK
AUTH
293 0.62 15.78
ILLINOIS ST 291 0.62 16.4
HAWAII ST 250 0.53 16.93
ANCHORAGE ALASKA 246 0.52 17.46
MASSACHUSETTS ST 236 0.5 17.96
Table B.6: Competitive Sample Frequent Issuers
Issuer Name Frequency Percent Cum
NEW YORK N Y 1,644 2.34 2.34
NEVADA ST 745 1.06 3.4
WASHINGTON ST 724 1.03 4.43
MINNESOTA ST 697 0.99 5.42
SOUTH CAROLINA ST 673 0.96 6.38
CONNECTICUT ST 637 0.91 7.28
CALIFORNIA ST 590 0.84 8.12
ANNE ARUNDEL CNTY MD 471 0.67 8.79
PENNSYLVANIA ST 462 0.66 9.45
SAN FRANCISCO CALIF CITY & CNTY 460 0.65 10.11
FLORIDA ST BRD ED PUB ED 445 0.63 10.74
GEORGIA ST 424 0.6 11.34
SUFFOLK CNTY N Y 414 0.59 11.93
KING CNTY WASH 379 0.54 12.47
MASSACHUSETTS ST 373 0.53 13
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Table B.7: Random Coefficients Model, DV = Offering Price
Negotiated Sale Competitive Sale
Trade Pricet−1 0.112 *** 0.095 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.008 )
Trade Yieldt−1 0.023 0.082 ***
( 0.022 ) ( 0.015 )
Issuer variation 0.199 0.199
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
Issuance Variation 0.366 0.366
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
County 0.665 *** 0.227 ***
( 0.111 ) ( 0.053 )
State 0.977 *** -0.007
( 0.109 ) ( 0.064 )
School District 0.048 -0.170 ***
( 0.078 ) ( 0.048 )
Special District -0.211 * -0.690 ***
( 0.111 ) ( 0.080 )
Town/Township 0.638 *** 0.000
( 0.161 ) ( 0.074 )
Credit Rating 0.013 *** 0.028 ***
( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 )
Coupon rate 8.186 *** 5.814 ***
( 0.024 ) ( 0.018 )
Call Option 4.407 *** -0.591 ***
( 0.123 ) ( 0.077 )
Bank Qualified 1.242 *** 0.990 ***
( 0.088 ) ( 0.052 )
Sinking Fund 3.725 *** 1.064 ***
( 0.162 ) ( 0.121 )
Insured -0.934 *** -1.122 ***
( 0.069 ) ( 0.048 )
Ln(Offering Par) 0.095 *** 0.169 ***
( 0.025 ) ( 0.015 )
New (vs. Refunding) -0.946 *** -0.276 ***
( 0.060 ) ( 0.036 )
Market Yield (MMA) -4.522 *** -3.568 ***
( 0.069 ) ( 0.044 )
Maturity & Year Effects YES YES
Observations 43,304 61,828
Issuers 3,837 4,310
Issuances 8,033 12,010
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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B.2 Series-level Descriptives and Checks
Table B.10 replicates Table 3.4 but with additional maturity level controls. Results
remain the same on the previously included variables. Maturity levels are weighted as dis-
cussed in the research design section. These covariates have the expected signs. Investors
require interest compensation for the call risk, therefore, callable securities are associated
with higher borrowing costs. Bank-qualified securities are more attractive to commercial
banks who are willing to accept lower returns. Therefore, bank-qualified issues are asso-
ciated with lower borrowing costs. Higher credit ratings tend to reduce borrowing costs,
however, this relationship is not statistically significant. Higher prevailing muni market
rates result in higher borrowing costs, TIC. These results are robust to exclusion of reces-
sion years, 2008 and 2009 (not shown here, available upon request).
Table B.8: Competitive IPREO Sample Summary
Variable N Mean Std Min Max
True Interest Cost (TIC) 6,863 3.18 1.02 0.30 7.44
Trade Yieldt−1 6,863 -0.06 0.16 -3.43 2.80
Trade Pricet−1 6,863 0.09 0.85 -14.06 31.74
Market yield (BBI20) 6,863 4.29 0.43 3.36 5.50
ln(Offering Par) 6,863 16.10 1.10 13.24 20.33
ln(Total Debt) 6,863 18.08 1.19 12.25 22.38
ln(Population) 6,863 10.85 1.42 4.30 20.06
Table B.9: IPREO Sample Distribution of Issuer Types
School Districts 2,614 38,09 38.09
Cities 1,897 27.64 65.73
Counties 1,067 15.55 81.28
Towns/Townships 927 13.51 94.79
Special Districts 358 5.22 100.00
Total 6,863 100
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Table B.10: Panel Fixed Effects, Competitive Sales, DV =
TIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TradeY ieldi,t−1 1.05*** 1.23***
(0.10) (0.13)
TradePricei,t−1 -0.02 0.08***
(0.02) (0.03)
Weighted Credit rating -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Weighted Time to Maturity -0.18*** -0.09* -0.17*** -0.10**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Weighted Insurance 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.11
(0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.26)
Weighted Sinking Fund 2.66*** 1.84** 2.58*** 2.07***
(0.81) (0.79) (0.80) (0.76)
Weighted Capital Purpose 0.62** 0.54** 0.61** 0.57**
(0.30) (0.27) (0.30) (0.27)
Weighted Call Option 4.65*** 3.40*** 4.55*** 3.64***
(0.97) (1.00) (0.98) (0.95)
Weighted Bank qualification -2.50*** -2.18*** -2.49*** -2.18***
(0.35) (0.32) (0.35) (0.34)
ln(Total Debt) 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Issue Par) 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
ln(Population) -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Market yield (BBI20) 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.60***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 1.14*** 1.02*** 1.14*** 1.02***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Bonds/Series 7,619 7,619 7,619 7,619
R2 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.76
Issuers 2,787 2,787 2,787 2,787
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the issuer level.
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C.1 Descriptives
Table C.1 provides descriptive statistics for the random sample of investment-grade,
non-callable, tax-exempt, unlimited general obligation bond CUSIPs. Recall that the unit
of observation is CUSIP-years. The breakdown by trade type shows that there are a lot
more sales to customers and interdealer trades than purchases from the customers. This
makes sense given that most muni holders are buy-and-hold-type investors. The average
muni age in the sample is a little over three years and the average time remaining until
maturity is 6.6 years. Almost half the outstanding securities are bank-qualified and 41%
are insured. Rating of 12 corresponds to the lowest investment-grade rating and the rating
of 21 corresponds the highest investment-grade rating. The credit rating scale constructed
for this study is the average of all available credit ratings provided by the three major rating
agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poors, and Fitch Rating.
Table C.1: Summary Statistics: Non-callable Securities
Variable N Mean Std Min Max
# of All Trades 127,662 3.81 12.11 0.00 1392
# of Interdealer trades 127,662 1.50 5.04 0.00 392
# of Purchases 127,662 0.84 2.62 0.00 134
# of Sales 127,662 1.48 5.36 0.00 906
Age 127,662 3.21 2.78 0.00 22
Bank Qualified 127,662 0.53 0.50 0.00 1
Time to Maturity 127,662 5.19 2.98 0.00 26
Yield Volatility (All) 127,662 0.04 0.13 0.00 25
Yield Volatility (Dealer) 127,662 0.01 0.06 0.00 13
Yield Volatility (Purchase) 127,662 0.06 0.15 0.00 6
Yield Volatility (Sale) 127,662 0.05 0.13 0.00 5
Price Volatility (All) 127,662 0.16 0.33 0.00 10
Price Volatility (Dealer) 127,662 0.14 0.38 0.00 14
Price Volatility (Purchases) 127,662 0.26 0.64 0.00 12
Price Volatility (Sale) 127,662 0.23 0.50 0.00 9
Unemployment rate 127,478 7.05 2.01 2.60 14
Credit Rating 127,662 18.46 1.39 12.00 21
Coupon Rate 127,662 4.05 1.04 1.00 12
An interesting pattern emerges from the yield and price volatility measures. Dealer
trades display the lowest yield and price volatilities on average. This is not surprising given
that the dealers are more sophisticated and knowledgeable of the market than the retail
investors. Purchases from customers display the highest volatility which may be partially
due to the market illiquidity. In periods of high demand, investors and dealers may overpay
for the securities to balance their portfolios, for example.
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics: Callable Securities
Variable N Mean Std Min Max
# of All Trades 342,573 4.83 21.25 0.00 3506
# of Interdealer trades 342,573 1.67 7.42 0.00 933
# of Purchases 342,573 1.02 3.87 0.00 533
# of Sales 342,573 2.15 11.36 0.00 2071
Age 342,573 4.96 3.35 0.00 23
Bank Qualified 342,573 0.32 0.46 0.00 1
Time to Maturity 112,831 10.40 4.29 0.04 35
Time to Call (All) 342,573 8.25 4.57 0.00 36
Time to Call (Dealer) 84,313 5.08 2.87 0.00 15
Time to Call (Purchase) 102,441 4.72 2.75 0.00 14
Time to Call (Sale) 110,752 5.06 2.90 0.00 15
Yield Volatility (All) 342,573 0.05 0.16 0.00 23
Yield Volatility (Dealer) 342,573 0.01 0.13 0.00 38
Yield Volatility (Purchase) 342,573 0.07 0.18 0.00 18
Yield Volatility (Sale) 342,573 0.06 0.17 0.00 15
Price Volatility (All) 342,573 0.17 0.35 0.00 18
Price Volatility (Dealer) 342,573 0.14 0.38 0.00 18
Price Volatility (Purchase) 342,573 0.28 0.66 0.00 25
Price Volatility (Sale) 342,573 0.22 0.47 0.00 27
Unemployment rate 341,845 7.06 2.14 2.60 14
Credit Rating 342,573 18.47 1.36 12.00 21
Coupon Rate 342,573 4.62 0.57 1.50 9
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Table C.3: Non-Callable, Unrated Securities: Random-
Effects Tobit, DV= # of Trades per Year per CUSIP
All Trades Interdealer Purchases
from
Customers
Sales to
Customers
Age 0.27 *** 0.09 *** 0.12 *** 0.08 ***
( 0.01 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
Time to Maturity 0.36 *** 0.15 *** 0.06 *** 0.19 ***
( 0.01 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
Age * Bank-qualified -0.20 *** -0.06 *** -0.09 *** -0.04 ***
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
Yield Volatility 1.93 *** 0.17 *** 0.35 *** 1.04 ***
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.04 )
Price Volatility 3.96 *** 2.24 *** 0.76 *** 1.15 ***
( 0.03 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.01 )
Unemployment Rate 0.12 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 ***
( 0.01 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Obs (CUSIP-years) 540,309 540,309 540,309 540,309
# of securities 109,354 109,354 109,354 109,354
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1
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